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### 1nc – cir

#### CIR Will Pass Now – Obama Has the PC and Hes Pushing IT

By: Reid J. Epstein 10/17, 2013 Obama’s latest push features a familiar strategy http://dyn.politico.com/printstory.cfm?uuid=00B694F1-5D59-4D13-B6D1-FC437A465923

President Barack Obama made his plans for his newly won political capital official — he’s going to hammer House Republicans on immigration.¶ And it’s evident from his public and private statements that Obama’s latest immigration push is, in at least one respect, similar to his fiscal showdown strategy: yet again, the goal is to boost public pressure on House Republican leadership to call a vote on a Senate-passed measure.¶ “The majority of Americans think this is the right thing to do,” Obama said Thursday at the White House. “And it’s sitting there waiting for the House to pass it. Now, if the House has ideas on how to improve the Senate bill, let’s hear them. Let’s start the negotiations. But let’s not leave this problem to keep festering for another year, or two years, or three years. This can and should get done by the end of this year.”¶ (WATCH: Assessing the government shutdown's damage)¶ And yet Obama spent the bulk of his 20-minute address taking whack after whack at the same House Republicans he’ll need to pass that agenda, culminating in a jab at the GOP over the results of the 2012 election — and a dare to do better next time.¶ “You don’t like a particular policy or a particular president? Then argue for your position,” Obama said. “Go out there and win an election. Push to change it. But don’t break it. Don’t break what our predecessors spent over two centuries building. That’s not being faithful to what this country’s about.”¶ Before the shutdown, the White House had planned a major immigration push for the first week in October. But with the shutdown and looming debt default dominating the discussion during the last month, immigration reform received little attention on the Hill.¶ (PHOTOS: Immigration reform rally on the National Mall)¶ Immigration reform allies, including Obama’s political arm, Organizing for Action, conducted a series of events for the weekend of Oct. 5, most of which received little attention in Washington due to the the shutdown drama. But activists remained engaged, with Dream Act supporters staging a march up Constitution Avenue, past the Capitol to the Supreme Court Tuesday, to little notice of the Congress inside.¶ Obama first personally signaled his intention to re-emerge in the immigration debate during an interview Tuesday with the Los Angeles Univision affiliate, conducted four hours before his meeting that day with House Democrats.¶ Speaking of the week’s fiscal landmines, Obama said: “Once that’s done, you know, the day after, I’m going to be pushing to say, call a vote on immigration reform.”¶ (Also on POLITICO: GOP blame game: Who lost the government shutdown?)¶ When he met that afternoon in the Oval Office with the House Democratic leadership, Obama said that he planned to be personally engaged in selling the reform package he first introduced in a Las Vegas speech in January.¶ Still, during that meeting, Obama knew so little about immigration reform’s status in the House that he had to ask Rep. Xavier Becerra (D-Calif.) how many members of his own party would back a comprehensive reform bill, according to a senior Democrat who attended.¶ The White House doesn’t have plans yet for Obama to participate in any new immigration reform events or rallies — that sort of advance work has been hamstrung by the 16-day government shutdown.¶ But the president emerged on Thursday to tout a “broad coalition across America” that supports immigration reform. He also invited House Republicans to add their input specifically to the Senate bill — an approach diametrically different than the House GOP’s announced strategy of breaking the reform into several smaller bills.¶ White House press secretary Jay Carney echoed Obama’s remarks Thursday, again using for the same language on immigration the White House used to press Republicans on the budget during the shutdown standoff: the claim that there are enough votes in the House to pass the Senate’s bill now, if only it could come to a vote.¶ “When it comes to immigration reform … we’re confident that if that bill that passed the Senate were put on the floor of the House today, it would win a majority of the House,” Carney said. “And I think that it would win significant Republican votes.”

#### Cuba policy changes require tons of political capital and trade off with the rest of Obama’s agenda

Global Post 10 – “Midterms and a changing face of Congress,” November 10, 2010, online: <http://www.globalpost.com/webblog/cuba/midterms-and-changing-face-congress>

The November 2 midterm elections resulted in a new balance of power in Congress, most notably in the House of Representatives—now a Republican majority house. Domestic implications aside, the shift in power will have a significant effect on foreign policy initiatives, not least of which (for our purposes) is Cuba policy.¶ First of all, the next head of the House Foreign Affairs Committee—changing because the majority party has the privilege of holding this seat—will be Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R-FL), the unrelenting anti-Castro, pro-embargo ranking Republican. She will replace Representative Howard Berman (D-CA), an advocate for modest rapprochement with Havana and co-sponsor of stalled bipartisan legislation to end the U.S. ban on travel to Cuba.¶ To be fair, we were not counting on much happening regarding the embargo in the short term, even with a Democratic House. But with Ileana at the helm of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, any loosening of restrictions will be out of the question. Significant changes in Cuba policy, without some sort of unforeseen breakthrough, will almost certainly be tabled until 2012.¶ Of course, although President Obama cannot lift the heavy embargo legislation on his own, he can use his executive authority to dismantle parts of it.¶ But it is highly unlikely that the President will spend any of his diminished political capital on the issue of Cuba when there is so little potential gain for him in doing so. The likely cost—say, a storm of ill will from Republicans in Congress and from an easily angered public that is vigilant these days for signs of executive overreach—simply outweighs any benefit that might emerge… a positive reaction from the global community, perhaps? The promise of applause from partners abroad has not been the impetus for any change on U.S. policy toward Cuba in prior years and will not be now, not even when the entire body of the United Nations General Assembly (save Israel) condemns the embargo. Every year the vote is taken and every year the tiny U.S. team has become more outnumbered: in 2008 the vote was 185 to 3; in 2009, 187 to 3; and now in 2010 (last week), 187 to 2—the two being the United States and Israel, a country whose citizens freely travel to, spend and invest in Cuba.¶

#### PC Key to Immigration

By: Reid J. Epstein 10/17, 2013 Obama’s latest push features a familiar strategy http://dyn.politico.com/printstory.cfm?uuid=00B694F1-5D59-4D13-B6D1-FC437A465923

It is exactly that sort of say-no attitude among Republicans that the White House has signaled it will highlight in its immigration push.¶ Obama himself said there won’t always be agreements, but in his repeated praise for “reasonable Republicans,” he made clear that he will continue to point to conservative and tea party-affiliated Republicans as the impediment to the progress he seeks — and pushing GOP lawmakers on this issue, as he did in the recent fiscal fights, to sign on to some version of the Senate’s latest compromise.¶ “We all know that we have divided government right now,” Obama said Thursday. “There’s a lot of noise out there, and the pressure from the extremes affect how a lot of members of Congress see the day-to-day work that’s supposed to be done here.”

#### Immigration reform expands skilled labor—spurs relations and economic growth in China and India.

LA Times 11/9/12 [Other countries eagerly await U.S. immigration reform, <http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/world_now/2012/11/us-immigration-reform-eagerly-awaited-by-source-countries.html>]

"Comprehensive immigration reform will see expansion of skilledlabor visas," predicted B. Lindsay Lowell, director of policy studies for the Institute for the Study of International Migration at Georgetown University. A former research chief for the congressionally appointed Commission on Immigration Reform, Lowell said he expects to see at least a fivefold increase in the number of highly skilled labor visas that would provide "a significantshot in the arm for India and China." There is widespreadconsensus among economists and academics that skilled migration fostersnewtrade and business relationships between countries andenhances links to the global economy, Lowell said. "Countries like India and China weigh the opportunities of business abroad from their expats with the possibility of brain drain, and I think they still see the immigration opportunity as a biggerplusthan not," he said.

#### US-Indian relations avert South Asian nuclear war.

Schaffer 2 [Spring 2002, Teresita—Director of the South Asia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Security, Washington Quarterly, Lexis]

Washington's increased interest in India since the late 1990s reflects India's economic expansion and position as Asia's newest rising power. New Delhi, for its part, is adjusting to the end of the Cold War. As a result, both giant democracies see that they can benefit by closer cooperation. For Washington, the advantages include a wider network of friends in Asia at a time when the region is changing rapidly, as well as a stronger position from which to help calm possible future nuclear tensions in the region. Enhanced trade and investment benefit both countries and are a India. For India, the country's ambition to assume a stronger leadership role in the world and to maintain an economy that lifts its people out of poverty depends critically on good relations with the United States.

### 1nc – t

#### Interpretation – Economic engagement is direct investment – not removal of RESTRICTIONS

Haass, 2K – Brookings Foreign Policy Studies director

[Richard, and Meghan O'Sullivan, "Introduction" in Honey and Vinegar, ed. by Haass and O'Sullivan, google books]

Architects of engagement strategies have a **wide variety** of incentives from which to choose. Economic engagement might offer tangible incentives such as export credits, investment insurance or promotion, access to technology, loans, and economic aid." Other equally useful economic incentives involve the removal of penalties, whether they be trade embargoes, investment bans, or high tariffs that have impeded economic relations between the United States and the target country. In addition, facilitated entry into the global economic arena and the institutions that govem it rank among the most potent incentives in today's global market."

#### Violation – the aff only gets rid of something that PREVENTS engagement, but doesn’t directly INCREASE engagement

#### That’s a voting issue

#### They explode the topic – every possible restrictions suddenly becomes a viable aff

#### And they wreck neg ground – they can get claim advantages off getting rid of restrictions, but not defend INVESTMENT

### 1nc – ag

#### Cuba is transitioning to sustainable agriculture because the embargo- the plan reverses that

Gonzalez, 03 - Professor of International Law at Seattle University. (Carmen, 2003. "Seasons of Resistance: Sustainable Agriculture and Food Security in Cuba". Tulane Environmental Law Journal. papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\_id=987944)

Cuba was able to transform its agricultural development model as a consequence of the political and economic autonomy occasioned by its relative economic isolation, including its exclusion from major international financial and trade institutions.411 Paradoxically, while the U.S. embargo subjected Cuba to immense economic hardship, it also gave the Cuban government free rein to adopt agricultural policies that ran counter to the prevailing neoliberal model and that protected Cuban farmers against ruinous competition from highly subsidized agricultural producers in the United States and the European Union.412 Due to U.S.¶ pressure, Cuba was excluded from regional and international financial institutions, including the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the Inter-American Development Bank.413 Cuba also failed to reach full membership in any regional trade association and was barred from the negotiations for the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA).414 However, as U.S. agribusiness clamors to ease trade restrictions with Cuba, the lifting of the embargo and the end of Cuba’s economic isolation may only be a matter of time.415 It is unclear how the Cuban government will respond to the immense political and economic pressure from the United States to enter into bilateral or multilateral trade agreements that would curtail Cubansovereignty and erode protection for Cuban agriculture.416 If Cuba accedes to the dictates of agricultural trade liberalization, it appears likely that Cuba’s gains in agricultural diversification and food self-sufficiency will be undercut by cheap, subsidized food imports from the United States and other industrialized countries.417 Furthermore, Cuba’s experiment with organic and semi-organic agriculture may be jeopardized if the Cuban government is either unwilling or unable to restrict the sale of agrochemicals to Cuban farmers—as the Cuban government failed to restrict U.S. rice imports in the first half of the twentieth century.418 Cuba is once again at a crossroads—as it was in 1963, when the government abandoned economic diversification, renewed its emphasis on sugar production, and replaced its trade dependence on the United States with trade dependence on the socialist bloc. In the end, the future of Cuban agriculture will likely turn on a combination of external factors (such as world market prices for Cuban exports and Cuba’s future economic integration with the United States) and internal factors (such as the level of grassroots and governmental support for the alternative development model developed during the Special Period). While this Article has examined the major pieces of legislation that transformed agricultural production in Cuba, and the government’s implementation of these laws, it is important to remember that these reforms had their genesis in the economic crisis of the early 1990s and in the creative legal, and extra-legal, survival strategies developed by ordinary Cubans.419 The¶ distribution of land to thousands of small producers and the promotion of urban agriculture were in response to the self-help measures undertaken by Cuban citizens during the Special Period. As the economic crisis intensified, Cuban citizens spontaneously seized and cultivated parcels of land in state farms, along the highways, and in vacant lots, and started growing food in patios, balconies, front yards, and community gardens. Similarly, the opening of the agricultural markets was in direct response to the booming black market and its deleterious effect on the state’s food distribution system. Finally, it was the small private farmer, the neglected stepchild of the Revolution, who kept alive the traditional agroecological techniques that formed the basis of Cuba’s experiment with organic agriculture. The survival of Cuba’s alternative agricultural model will therefore depend, at least in part, on whether this model is viewed by Cuban citizens and by the Cuban leadership as a necessary adaptation to severe economic crisis or as a path-breaking achievement worthy of pride and emulation. The history of Cuban agriculture has been one of resistance and accommodation to larger economic and political forces that shaped the destiny of the island nation. Likewise, the transformation of Cuban agriculture has occurred through resistance and accommodation by Cuban workers and farmers to the hardships of the Special Period. The lifting of the U.S. economic embargo and the subjection of Cuba to the full force of economic globalization will present an enormous challenge to the retention of an agricultural development model borne of crisis and isolation. Whether Cuba will be able to resist the re-imposition of a capital-intensive, export-oriented, import-reliant agricultural model will depend on the ability of the Cuban leadership to appreciate the benefits of sustainable agriculture and to protect Cuba’s alternative agricultural model in the face of overwhelming political and economic pressure from the United States and from the global trading system.

#### Cuban agriculture is key to solve the environment

Peters 10 (Kathryn A. Peters, J.D. from the University of Oregon . "Creating a Sustainable Urban Agriculture Revolution". University of Oregon Law School. law.uoregon.edu/org/jell/docs/251/peters.pdf)

While urban agriculture was a response to a dramatic crisis in ¶ Cuba’s history, through the development of a community-based ¶ system of cultivation on previously vacant lots employing organic ¶ farming techniques, Cuba has created a sustainable food production ¶ system.189 As of 2005, Havana was producing over ninety percent of ¶ the perishable produce consumed in its city as well as a significant ¶ portion of its milk and meat.190 With government support, the urban ¶ gardens have become a profitable economic enterprise for many ¶ Cubans.191 Local access to fresh foods has added diversity to the ¶ Cuban diet and reduced the carbon footprint associated with its food ¶ supply by reducing the transportation and chemical input required to ¶ grow and transport the food.192 The development of urban farming ¶ has also ensured food security for Cuba.193 The success of Cuba’s ¶ system has established the country as a model for the urban ¶ production of sustainable agriculture around the world.194¶ In transitioning to a sustainable urban agricultural system, Cuba ¶ has drastically reduced its harmful impacts on the environment. ¶ Cubans have been able to significantly reduce their carbon footprints ¶ as their food supply is no longer shipped across oceans and Cuban ¶ residents can walk to local markets for fresh produce rather than drive¶ to grocery stores.195 Reduced mechanization in food production ¶ further reduces carbon emissions. Increased urban vegetation also ¶ mitigates the impact of climate change because vegetation has a ¶ cooling effect when air temperatures are high.196 Because much of ¶ Cuba’s urban land is now vegetative, surface temperatures in Cuba ¶ may remain cooler due to the thermoregulation created by the ¶ vegetation cover.197¶ According to Dr. Nelso Camponioni Concepción, the Cuban ¶ government, through its urban agricultural program, aims “to gain the ¶ most food from every square meter of available space.”198 By ¶ utilizing available urban space for sustainable food production, Cuba ¶ is reducing its impact on the planet’s carrying capacity. The organic ¶ urban gardening techniques do not consume greenspace or harm the ¶ environment; therefore, measuring the true cost of externalities is not ¶ an issue. The growth of the urban gardens has created an increasing ¶ food supply and a new economy for many Cubans without negatively ¶ impacting the environment or society.

#### Billions die and risks extinction

Cummins and Allen, 10 (Ronnie, Int’l. Dir. – Organic Consumers Association, and Will, Policy Advisor – Organic Consumers Association, “Climate Catastrophe: Surviving the 21st Century”, 2-14, http://www.commondreams.org/view/2010/02/14-6)

The hour is late. Leading climate scientists such as James Hansen are literally shouting at the top of their lungs that the world needs to reduce emissions by 20-40% as soon as possible, and 80-90% by the year 2050, if we are to avoid climate chaos, crop failures, endless wars, melting of the polar icecaps, and a disastrous rise in ocean levels. Either we radically reduce CO2 and carbon dioxide equivalent (CO2e, which includes all GHGs, not just CO2) pollutants (currently at 390 parts per million and rising 2 ppm per year) to 350 ppm, including agriculture-derived methane and nitrous oxide pollution, or else survival for the present and future generations is in jeopardy. As scientists warned at Copenhagen, business as usual and a corresponding 7-8.6 degree Fahrenheit rise in global temperatures means that the carrying capacity of the Earth in 2100 will be reduced to one billion people. Under this hellish scenario, billions will die of thirst, cold, heat, disease, war, and starvation. If the U.S. significantly reduces greenhouse gas emissions, other countries will follow. One hopeful sign is the recent EPA announcement that it intends to regulate greenhouse gases as pollutants under the Clean Air Act. Unfortunately we are going to have to put tremendous pressure on elected public officials to force the EPA to crack down on GHG polluters (including industrial farms and food processors). Public pressure is especially critical since "just say no" Congressmen-both Democrats and Republicans-along with agribusiness, real estate developers, the construction industry, and the fossil fuel lobby appear determined to maintain "business as usual."

### 1nc – shunning

#### The affirmative engages with known human rights abusers-— *moral duty* to shun

Beversluis 89 — Eric H. Beversluis, Professor of Philosophy and Economics at Aquinas College, holds an A.B. in Philosophy and German from Calvin College, an M.A. in Philosophy from Northwestern University, an M.A. in Economics from Ohio State University, and a Ph.D. in the Philosophy of Education from Northwestern University, 1989 (“On Shunning Undesirable Regimes: Ethics and Economic Sanctions,” *Public Affairs Quarterly*, Volume 3, Number 2, April, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via JSTOR, p. 17-19)

A fundamental task of morality is resolving conflicting interests. If we both want the same piece of land, ethics provides a basis for resolving the conflict by identifying "mine" and "thine." If in anger I want to smash your [end page 17] face, ethics indicates that your face's being unsmashed is a legitimate interest of yours which takes precedence over my own interest in expressing my rage. Thus ethics identifies the rights of individuals when their interests conflict. But how can a case for shunning be made on this view of morality? Whose interests (rights) does shunning protect? The shunner may well have to sacrifice his interest, e.g., by foregoing a beneficial trade relationship, but whose rights are thereby protected? In shunning there seem to be no "rights" that are protected. For shunning, as we have seen, does not assume that the resulting cost will change the disapproved behavior. If economic sanctions against South Africa will not bring apartheid to an end, and thus will not help the blacks get their rights, on what grounds might it be a duty to impose such sanctions? We find the answer when we note that there is another "level" of moral duties. When Galtung speaks of "reinforcing … morality," he has identified a duty that goes beyond specific acts of respecting people's rights. The argument goes like this: There is more involved in respecting the rights of others than not violating them by one's actions. For if there is such a thing as a moral order, which unites people in a moral community, then surely one has a **duty** (at least prima facie) not only to avoid violating the rights of others with one's actions but **also to support that moral order**. Consider that the moral order itself **contributes significantly** to people's rights being respected. It does so by **encouraging and reinforcing** moral behavior and by **discouraging and sanctioning** immoral behavior. In this moral community people **mutually reinforce** each other's moral behavior and thus raise the overall level of morality. Were this moral order to disintegrate, were people to stop reinforcing each other's moral behavior, there would be **much more violation of people's rights**. Thus to the extent that behavior affects the moral order, it indirectly affects people's rights. And this is where shunning fits in. Certain types of behavior constitute **a direct attack on the moral order**. When the violation of human rights is **flagrant**, **willful**, and **persistent**, the offender is, as it were, thumbing her nose at the moral order, publicly rejecting it as binding her behavior. Clearly such behavior, if tolerated by society, will weaken and perhaps eventually **undermine altogether** the moral order. Let us look briefly at those three conditions which turn immoral behavior into an attack on the moral order. An immoral action is flagrant if it is "extremely or deliberately conspicuous; notorious, shocking." Etymologically the word means "burning" or "blazing." The definition of shunning implies therefore that those offenses require shunning which are shameless or indiscreet, which the person makes no effort to hide and no good-faith effort to excuse. Such actions "blaze forth" as an attack on the moral order. But to merit shunning the action must also be willful and persistent. We do not consider the actions of the "backslider," the [end page 18] weak-willed, the one-time offender to be challenges to the moral order. It is the repeat offender, the unrepentant sinner, the cold-blooded violator of morality whose behavior demands that others publicly reaffirm the moral order. When someone **flagrantly**, **willfully**, and **repeatedly** violates the moral order, those who believe in the moral order, the members of the moral community, **must respond in a way that reaffirms the legitimacy of that moral order**. How does shunning do this? First, by refusing publicly to have to do with such a person one announces **support for the moral order** and **backs up the announcement with action**. This action **reinforces the commitment to the moral order** both of the shunner and of the other members of the community. (Secretary of State Shultz in effect made this argument in his call for international sanctions on Libya in the early days of 1986.) Further, shunning may have **a moral effect** on the shunned person, even if the direct impact is not adequate to change the immoral behavior. If the shunned person thinks of herself as part of the moral community, shunning may well make clear to her that she is, in fact, removing herself from that community by the behavior in question. Thus shunning may achieve by **moral suasion** what cannot be achieved by "force." Finally, shunning may be a form of punishment, of **moral sanction**, whose appropriateness depends not on whether it will change the person's behavior, but on whether he deserves the punishment for violating the moral order. Punishment then can be viewed as a way of **maintaining the moral order**, of "purifying the community" after it has been made "unclean," as ancient communities might have put it. Yet not every immoral action requires that we shun. As noted above, we live in a fallen world. None of us is perfect. If the argument implied that we may have nothing to do with anyone who is immoral, it would consist of a reductio of the very notion of shunning. To isolate a person, to shun him, to give him the "silent treatment," is a serious thing. Nothing strikes at a person's wellbeing as person more directly than such ostracism. Furthermore, not every immoral act is an attack on the moral order. Actions which are repented and actions which are done out of weakness of will clearly violate but do not attack the moral order. Thus because of the serious nature of shunning, it is defined as a response not just to any violation of the moral order, but to attacks on the moral order itself through flagrant, willful, and persistent wrongdoing. We can also now see why failure to shun can under certain circumstances suggest complicity. But it is not that we have a duty to shun because failure to do so suggests complicity. Rather, because we have **an obligation to shun** in certain circumstances, when we fail to do so others may interpret our failure as **tacit complicity** in the **willful**, **persistent**, and **flagrant immorality**.

### 1nc – pink tide

#### Chavez’s death means Pink tide at a cross road

\*Chavez was critical to petro diplomacy which funded the pink tide, but maduro doesn’t have the same leverage that he did

Panizza ’13 Dr Francisco Panizza is the Head of the Latin America International Affairs Programme at LSE IDEAS. He is a Reader in the Department of Government at the London School of Economics. “Latin America: Life after Chavez (and Lula)” – April 4th – http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/ideas/2013/04/latin-america-life-after-chavez-and-lula/

The death of Chávez and the succession of Lula by Dilma Rousseff in Brazil leaves a big vacuum in the Latin American left. Even if, as likely as it is, Nicolás Maduro wins the presidency in Venezuela in April, he is no Chávez and will not have the resources that Chávez had to promote his petro-diplomacy. Three years into her first term in office, Rousseff remains highly popular in Brazil and will be a strong candidate for re-election in 2014. But she does not have the same presence as Lula in Latin America and her foreign policy priorities are rather different than those of her political mentor. Moreover, Venezuela is in a dire economic situation and Brazil’s economic growth has been lacklustre over the past two years.¶ The death of Chávez and the absence of Lula from frontline regional politics do not mean that the Pink Tide is necessarily coming to an end. But together with the retake of economic growth and the election of Peña Nieto in Mexico, the strong economic performance of Colombia, Peru and Chile and the emergence of the Alianza Pacifico as an alternative to Mercosur, suggest the unfolding of a much more complex and diverse process of regional change than encapsulated by the narrative of the rise of the left.

The plan kills US resolve and funds the pink tide

\*embargo is key to resolve

Removing it will not solve relations and it will give money to legitimize the Cuban regime and allow them to partner with other socialist or anti-american countries

Brookes ‘9 (Peter – Heritage council, Senior Fellow, Brookes is serving his third term as a congressionally appointed member of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission. He previously served in the administration of President George W. Bush as deputy assistant secretary of defense for Asian and Pacific affairs. In this post, he was responsible for U.S. defense policy for 38 countries and five bilateral defense alliances in Asia, Brookes was a professional staff member with the House International Relations Committee. He also served with the CIA and the State Department at the United Nations. In the private sector, he worked in the defense and intelligence industries.¶ A decorated Navy veteran, Brookes served on active duty in Latin America, Asia and the Middle East in aviation and intelligence billets, Brookes, now a retired Navy commander, served as a reservist with the National Security Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, Naval Intelligence, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Office of the Vice President, Brookes is pursuing a doctorate at Georgetown University. He is a graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy (B.S.); the Defense Language Institute (Russian); the Naval War College; and the Johns Hopkins University (M.A.). He also has taught at the National Defense University and studied German and Polish, National Security Affairs, “Keep the Embargo, O” – April 16 – http://www.heritage.org/research/commentary/2009/04/keep-the-embargo-o)

Of course, the big empanada is the US economic embargo against Cuba, in place since 1962, which undoubtedly is the thing Havana most wants done away with -- without any concessions on Cuba's part, of course.¶ Lifting the embargo won't normalize relations, but instead legitimize -- and wave the white flag to -- Fidel's 50-year fight against the Yanquis, further lionizing the dictator and encouraging the Latin American Left.¶ Because the economy is nationalized, trade will pour plenty of cash into the Cuban national coffers -- allowing Havana to suppress dissent at home and bolster its communist agenda abroad.¶ The last thing we should do is to fill the pockets of a regime that'll use those profits to keep a jackboot on the neck of the Cuban people. The political and human-rights situation in Cuba is grim enough already.¶ The police state controls the lives of 11 million Cubans in what has become an island prison. The people enjoy none of the basic civil liberties -- no freedom of speech, press, assembly or association.¶ Security types monitor foreign journalists, restrict Internet access and foreign news and censor the domestic media. The regime holds more than 200 political dissidents in jails that rats won't live in.¶ We also don't need a pumped-up Cuba that could become a serious menace to US interests in Latin America, the Caribbean -- or beyond. (The likes of China, Russia and Iran might also look to partner with a revitalized Cuba.)¶ With an influx of resources, the Cuban regime would surely team up with the rulers of nations like Venezuela, Nicaragua and Bolivia to advance socialism and anti-Americanism in the Western Hemisphere.¶ The embargo has stifled Havana's ambitions ever since the Castros lost their Soviet sponsorship in the early 1990s. Anyone noticed the lack of trouble Cuba has caused internationally since then? Contrast that with the 1980s some time.¶ Regrettably, 110 years after independence from Spain (courtesy of Uncle Sam), Cuba still isn't free. Instead of utopia, it has become a dystopia at the hands of the Castro brothers.¶ The US embargo remains a matter of principle -- and an appropriate response to Cuba's brutal repression of its people. Giving in to evil only begets more of it. Haven't we learned that yet?¶ Until we see progress in loosing the Cuban people from the yoke of the communist regime, we should hold firm onto the leverage the embargo provides.

#### Castro-led pink tide causes US-Russia military confrontations.

\*with petro power they will pay Russia to guarantee their security which brings the US and Russia into confrontation

Walser ‘8 (Ray Walser, Senior Policy Analyst for Latin America at the Heritage Foundation – Chávez, Venezuela, and Russia: A New Cuban Missile Crisis? – WebMemo #2064 -- September 15th http://www.heritage.org/Research/LatinAmerica/wm2064.cfm)

Like his iconic mentor, Fidel Castro, Chávez thrives on mounting tensions and confrontation with the U.S. It is through confrontation that he attains political identity and larger-than-merited international standing. Like Fidel Castro, Chávez aspires to build and lead an anti-U.S., anti-Western coalition. Unlike Castro, however, Chávez is in possession of significant petroleum power and has varied sources of international support. There is danger that Chávez, like Castro, will invite Russia to serve as a guarantor of Venezuela's security and subsequently draw Russia, either willingly or unwillingly, into additional confrontations with the U.S. At present, Venezuela represents the single most difficult diplomatic and security challenge facing the U.S. in the immediate future. How the U.S. chooses to deal with this challenge will say much about the direction the next Administration will take as it shapes its policy toward America's neighbors in the hemisphere.

#### Small US-Russia conflicts can escalate or cause nuclear miscalc

\*US and Russia tensions are unpredictable which increases the risk of miscalc and the US or Russia would launch on warning causing nuclear war

Gottemoeller ‘8 (Rose Gottemoeller was sworn in as the United States Department of State's Assistant Secretary for Arms Control, Verification, and Compliance on April 6, 2009. She was the chief negotiator of the follow on for the Strategic Arms Reductions Treaty otherwise known as the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) with the Russian Federation. Since 2000, she had been with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace – “U.S.-Russia Cooperation on Iran: Aftermath of the Summer War in Georgia,” Carnegie Moscow Center, August- July 2008. PLESE NOTE – THIS CARD APPEARS IN A HOST OF CURRENT OPEN-SOURCE DEBATE DOCS AND THE URL THAT APPEARS ON THOSE CARDS MISDIRECTS TO A DIFFERENT Gottemoeller ARTICLE. The website below redirects to her October article: http://www.scribd.com/doc/13031239/RussianAmerican-Security-Relations-After-Georgia)

No holds barred, no rules—the United States and Russia may be heading to a confrontation more unpredictable and dangerous than any we have seen since the Cuban missile crisis. A confrontation today would be different—the two countries are in constant and intense communication, unlike the situation in 1962—but if those exchanges provoke mutual anger and recrimination, they have the potential to spark a dangerous crisis. This effect is especially dangerous because both countries are in presidential transitions. Russia, whose government is riven by corruption, internal competition, and disorder, is attempting an unprecedented tandem leadership arrangement. The United States is in the midst of its quadrennial election season, with both political parties competing to show that their man is more skilled and tough on national security issues than his opponent. The unpredictability of these two transitions stokes the potential for misunderstanding and descent into crisis. We must avoid such a crisis, because we have never succeeded in escaping the nuclear existential threat that we each pose to the other. We never even came close to transforming the U.S.–Russian relationship into one that is closer to that which the United States has with the United Kingdom or France. What if Russia had refused to confirm or deny that no nuclear weapons were on the bombers it flew to Venezuela? Our nuclear weapons are still faced off to launch on warning of an attack, and in a no-holds-barred confrontation between us, we could come close to nuclear catastrophe before we knew it.

### 1nc – sense of congress cp

#### The United States Congress should pass a non-binding “sense of congress” resolution stating that the United States federal government should substantially repeal its economic sanctions on Cuba.

#### Counterplan Solves Signal and Perception Arguments But Avoids Politics

Longley 2010 (Robert, About.com, US Government Info, http://usgovinfo.about.com/od/uscongress/a/senseof.htm)

When members of the House, Senate or entire Congress want to "send a message," or state an opinion, they try to pass a "sense of" resolution. Since such resolutions do not create law, what good are they? Simple or joint resolutions expressing the "sense of" the Senate, House or Congress merely express a majority opinion. They do not make law and are not enforceable. Only bills and joint resolutions create laws. "Sense of" legislation can come in the form of Simple Resolutions (H.Res. or S.Res.), used to express the opinion of the House or Senate alone, or as Concurrent Resolutions (H.Con.Res. or S.Con.Res.) used to express the opinion of the entire Congress. "Sense of" resolutions can also be added as amendments to regular House or Senate bills. Even when added to regular bills, "sense of" amendments have no force law. "Sense of" resolutions are typically used as: For the record: a way for individual members of Congress to go on the record as supporting or opposing a particular policy or concept; Political persuasion: a simple attempt by a group of members to persuade other members to support their cause or opinion; Appeal to the president: an attempt to get the president to take or not take some specific action (such as S.Con.Res. 2, considered by Congress in January 2007, condemning President Bush's order sending over 20,000 additional U.S. troops into the war in Iraq.), On foreign affairs: a way to express the opinion of the people of the United States to the government of a foreign nation; and Just saying "thanks": a way to send the congratulations or gratitude of Congress to individual citizens or groups. For example, congratulating U.S. Olympic champions or thanking military troops for their sacrifice. "Sense of" resolutions require only a simple majority vote to pass and, since they do not create laws, do not require the signature of the president. Although "sense of" resolutions have no force in law, foreign governments pay close attention to them as evidence of shifts in U.S. foreign policy priorities.

#### Sense of Congress Resolution Solves Via *Better Congressional Signal*, *Future Expectations* and *Anticipatory Behavior Changes* and *Future Binding Policy* – Competes and Avoids Politics Because its Non Binding and there is No Presidential Involvement

Posner 2008 (Eric A, Professor of Law, The University of Chicago and Jacob E. Gersen, Assistant Professor of Law, The University of Chicago. Stanford LR, December)

The academic literatures on these topics have different concerns, yet the themes are similar. Soft law refers to statements by lawmaking authorities that do not have the force of law (most often because they do not comply with relevant formalities or for other reasons are not regarded as legally binding 12), but nonetheless affect the behavior of others either (1) because others take the statements as credible expressions of policy judgments or intentions that, at some later point, might be embodied in formally binding law and reflected in the coercive actions of executive agents, or (2) because the statements provide epistemic guidance about how the authorities see the world. 13 Individuals, governments, states, and other agents use soft law in order to enter commitments and influence behavior where legal mechanisms are regarded as undesirable. Against this backdrop, it is a puzzle that no parallel literature has emerged in the field of legislation and legislative process. 14 One does not have to look hard to find a similar form of soft law: the congressional resolution. Congressional resolutions - whether concurrent or one-house - generally have no formal legal effect. 15 Periodically, proposals surface to pay more attention to the resolution as a mechanism for influencing statutory interpretation, 16 foreign policy, 17 or some other external matter. Yet the soft statute has [\*578] received little attention in scholarly work on legislation. 18 The conventional wisdom is that such measures lack importance because they do not create binding legal obligations. 19 They are cheap and often happy talk by legislatures, commending military officers for good service or sports teams for winning championships. In fact, many congressional resolutions are very serious: they assert controversial foreign policy judgments, urge the President to intervene in humanitarian crises or to avoid a military conflict, criticize allies and enemies, forecast plans for taxation and regulation, send signals to regulatory agencies about Congress's expectations, criticize the President's interpretations of executive power, advance interpretations of constitutional provisions and statutes, encourage state and local governments to address policy problems, identify public health threats that need funding, and much more. 20 Statutory soft law deserves more attention than it has received, especially in light of the large cognate literatures that examine the workings of soft law in other fields. In the course of analyzing congressional resolutions and other forms of legislative soft law - including hortatory statutes - we advance a general theory that explains the attractiveness of soft law, its advantages and disadvantages, and its place in our constitutional order. We show that soft public law is preferable to hard public law in identifiable cases and contexts. The congressional resolution is essentially a "soft statute" - a device for communicating the policy views and intentions of one or both houses of Congress. Legislative soft law communicates congressional intentions more accurately and cheaply than does a regular statute, which will usually reflect the views of the President as well. Legislative soft law communicates the views of a chamber or the Congress more accurately than do statements of individual legislators, whose views will often diverge from that of the majority. These communications can influence the behavior of the public and of other political institutions through three main mechanisms. First, a congressional communication affects people's beliefs about how Congress will (formally) regulate in the future, to the extent that it credibly reveals the political preferences of Congress (or its members or a substantial coalition of its members or its leadership, etc.). A soft statute thus anticipates a hard statute, [\*579] but when the target audience reacts appropriately to the soft statute, the hard statute may become unnecessary. Second, a congressional communication may have a purely epistemic effect. Information about Congress's views might cause people to change their beliefs about the state of the world. 21 Third, in some settings other institutions that generate formal law take legislative views as an input. Agencies, courts, and the President regularly incorporate legislative views as one of many factors in the construction of binding policy.

### 1nc – multilat

#### 1 Cuba will say no – they don’t trust we’ll follow through and the embrgo serves their interests

French 13, Director of the New America Foundation U.S. – Cuba Policy Initiative, (Anya Landau, “Secretary Kerry: Will He or Won't He Take On Cuba” http://thehavananote.com/2013/02/secretary\_kerry\_will\_he\_or\_wont\_he\_take\_cuba)

And, then there’s the Cuban government. As much as many in the Cuban government (particularly the diplomatic corps) want to reduce tensions with the United States and finally make real progress on long-standing grievances held by both sides, they aren’t desperate for the big thaw. Many U.S. analysts, including in government, speculate that this is because Cuba’s leaders don’t really want to change the relationship, that strife serves their needs better than would the alternative. That could be so, but there’s also a hefty amount of skepticism and pride on the Cuban side, as well. After so many decades and layers of what Cuba calls the U.S. blockade, Cubans are unwilling to have the terms of any ‘surrender’ dictated to them. In fact, they are bound and determined that there will be no surrender. They would argue, what is there to surrender but their government’s very existence, something the leadership obviously isn’t going to put on the table.¶ Many in the Cuban government question whether the U.S. would offer anything that truly matters to Cuba, or honor any commitments made. Arguably, the last deal the U.S. made good on was struck during the Missile Crisis of October 1963, and Cuba wasn’t even at the table for that. It’s a lesser known fact that the United States never fully implemented the 1994/1995 migration accords, which committed both nations to work to prevent migration by irregular means. The U.S. did stop accepting illegal migrants from Cuba found at sea, but it still accepts them when they reach our shores – thus dubbed our ‘wet foot, dry foot’ policy. And with our generous adjustment policy offering a green card after one year, the incentive to make the illegal trip remains largely in place.

**2 heg turn – Multilateralism kills heg – it causes delays and undermines international security**

**Gaffney 02, President of the Center For Security Policy, 8-27- (Frank J., The Wasington Times)**

This amounts to what Margaret Thatcher once famously derided [about the time she was warning George Bush pere and his advisers against "going wobbly" over Iraq in 1990] as the impossibility of "leadership by consensus." She recognized that, on matters of surpassing importance, the United States has to lead by providing direction and initiative, around which a broader or narrower consensus will ultimately form - not try to get everyone else to agree in advance to do what it believes must be done. We know in advance that the Baker diplomatic gambit would be a fool's errand, adding obstacles not clearing them away. Ever since the end of the Gulf war, the U.N. Security Council has been ever-less-willing to support intrusive inspections in Iraq. This was hardly surprising since at least three of the permanent, veto-wielding Council members [France, Russia and China] were anxious to curry favor with Saddam Hussein - especially if they could frustrate American policy in the process. Under present circumstances, an effort to secure from the U.N. what would amount to a casus belli with Iraq is more likely to produce further evidence of international opposition to U.S. action there, and intensify the multilateralists' contention that we lack the authority to undertake such action. In truth, this is but the latest manifestation of a struggle that has been going on since the end of the Cold War. Foreign governments, particularly the unfriendly ones [which has in recent years included a number of our allies], have striven to establish via treaties, "international norms" and other devices means of constraining the American "hyperpower." This sentiment enjoys considerable currency as well among the Vietnam generation of the U.S. security policy elite. During the Bush 41 administration, when Mr. Baker, Brent Scowcroft and Lawrence Eagleburger were last in office, Washington frequently acceded to such pressure. Usually, it claimed that doing so was necessary to: fashion multinational coalitions [so as to prosecute Operation Desert Storm], maintain "stability" [for example, to preserve the "territorial integrity" of Yugoslavia] and advance fatuous arms-control objectives [notably, "ridding the world of chemical weapons."] The American foreign policy establishment embraced the idea that diminishing U.S. sovereignty in these and other ways was an unavoidable, if not actually a desirable, component of forging a "New World Order." During its eight years in office, the Clinton team greatly exacerbated this trend. It became practically axiomatic in the 1990s that the United States could not, and certainly should not, consider doing anything internationally without a U.N. mandate. A series of "global" agreements - governing everything from climate change to nuclear tests to war crimes - were consummated with active U.S. involvement and with manifest disregard for American sovereignty and constitutional processes. Over time, the nation inexorably became hamstrung like Gulliver, both by myriad institutionalized constraints and obligations and by the logic that the United States was just another country, one whose vote and influence in multinational councils should count no more than any others'. Since taking office, President Bush has confronted this syndrome time and again. To his great credit - and to the outraged howls of self-described "internationalists," he has repeatedly acted to reassert our national sovereignty and to restore our ability to act unilaterally. He has renounced the Kyoto Protocol on global warming, rejected the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and "unsigned" the International Criminal Court treaty. He has also withdrawn the United States from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, clearing the way at last for the accelerated deployment of missile defense systems - including at sea, a highly promising option about which Mr. Bush was briefed last week in Crawford. The party line from the foreign policy establishment types at home and abroad is that such behavior constitutes damnable "unilateralism." The putative fear is that America will revert to isolationism. The real concern, however, is very different - namely, that the United States will appreciate that it is able to act alone where it must, and that it may just have the will to do so. The truth of the matter is that the world is a safer place, not only for American interests but for those of freedom-loving people elsewhere, when the United States has the military, economic and political power to engage unilaterally where necessary and is led by an individual who is willing competently to exercise such power.

#### Unilateralism sustains primacy—states bandwagon for fear of rising powers—which solves all their offense

**Seldena, 13** – assistant professor of political science at the University of Florida (Zachary, “Balancing Against or Balancing With? The Spectrum of Alignment and the Endurance of American Hegemony” Security Studies Volume 22, Issue 2, 2013, Taylor and Francis)

Understanding which of these choices—soft balancing against the hegemon or alignment with the hegemon—is more prevalent among second-tier states has significant ramifications for the endurance of American hegemony. The record of the 2001–2009 period indicates that a wide range of second-tier states not only aligned with the United States, they strengthened their security cooperation in a manner that extended the reach of the us military at a time when American foreign policy was widely seen as unilateral. 3 In addition, they did so by incurring certain costs that helped to spread the burden of maintaining the American hegemonic system. This pattern of alignment with the United States has implications for the endurance of American hegemony because states aligned with the United States may have more at stake in the maintenance of American hegemony than the United States itself. A smaller American naval presence in the Asia Pacific region, for example, may be seen as a relatively minor shift in the United States with some beneficial budgetary savings. In Vietnam, Australia, or the Philippines, however, such a shift could prompt a wholesale reevaluation of national defense policy and have costly implications. Therefore, second-tier states have an incentive to participate in activities that extend the endurance of American hegemony, even if they do not receive a formal security guarantee for their efforts.

This may have implications for American foreign policy. There are distinct policy recommendations flowing from the logic of those scholars and policy professionals who argue that a more proactive and unilateral foreign policy speeds the decline of American hegemony. The most important of these is that the United States should practice a policy of self-restraint that defers to international organizations, which would alleviate concerns about the current preponderance of the United States in the international system. 4 A policy of self-restraint would signal that the United States is not a threat to other major powers and preclude attempts at balancing. This policy would also help to set a norm for the behavior of future great powers and recognize the emerging reality of a multipolar world. 5 Another policy implication from this line of reasoning is that the United States should reduce its global military presence that both encourages balancing behavior by other states and speeds hegemonic decline by draining financial resources. 6

Yet, this policy of restraint may be precisely what would cause second-tier states to question the utility of their security relationship with the United States and move away from policies that help to maintain American hegemony. This could at least partially explain the trend of states moving to establish closer security relationships with the United States in the 2001–2009 period, when it was at its most proactive and least deferential to international organizations. States may logically conclude that a hegemon willing to project power regardless of international opinion will be likely to use its power in the defense of the hegemony that is in the interest of second-tier states. Second-tier states might be far less willing to contribute to the maintenance of American hegemony if the United States behaves in a manner that raises doubts as to the durability of its commitments or its willingness to use its power in the international arena. Thus, what would trigger a serious decline in the cooperation that helps to sustain American hegemony would be a self-imposed reduction in the ability of the United States to project power and an increased reluctance to use its power in support of its national interests.

#### Hegemony key to solve extinction

Thomas P.M. Barnett 11 Former Senior Strategic Researcher and Professor in the Warfare Analysis & Research Department, Center for Naval Warfare Studies, U.S. Naval War College American military geostrategist and Chief Analyst at Wikistrat., worked as the Assistant for Strategic Futures in the Office of Force Transformation in the Department of Defense, “The New Rules: Leadership Fatigue Puts U.S., and Globalization, at Crossroads,” March 7 http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/8099/the-new-rules-leadership-fatigue-puts-u-s-and-globalization-at-crossroads

It is worth first examining the larger picture: **We live in a time of arguably the greatest structural change in the global order yet endured**, **with this historical moment's most amazing feature being its** relative and absolute **lack of mass violence**. That is something to consider when Americans contemplate military intervention in Libya, because if we do take the step to prevent larger-scale killing by engaging in some killing of our own, we will not be adding to some fantastically imagined global death count stemming from the ongoing "megalomania" and "evil" of American "empire." We'll be engaging in the same sort of system-administering activity that has marked our **stunningly successful stewardship of global order** since World War II. Let me be more blunt: **As the guardian of globalization**, **the U.S. military has been the greatest force for peace the world has ever known**. Had America been removed from the global dynamics that governed the 20th century, the mass murder never would have ended. Indeed, it's entirely conceivable there would now be no identifiable human civilization left, once nuclear weapons entered the killing equation. But the **world did not keep sliding down that path of perpetual war**. **Instead, America stepped up and changed everything by ushering in our now-perpetual great-power peace**. **We introduced the international liberal trade order known as globalization** and played loyal Leviathan over its spread. **What resulted was the collapse of empires, an explosion of democracy**, the **persistent spread of human rights**, the liberation of women, **the doubling of life expectancy**, a roughly **10-fold increase in adjusted global GDP** **and a profound and persistent reduction in battle deaths from state-based conflicts.** That is what American "hubris" actually delivered. Please remember that the next time some TV pundit sells you the image of "unbridled" American military power as the cause of global disorder instead of its cure. With self-deprecation bordering on self-loathing, we now imagine a post-American world that is anything but. Just watch who scatters and who steps up as the Facebook revolutions erupt across the Arab world. While we might imagine ourselves the status quo power, we remain the world's most vigorously revisionist force. **¶** As for the sheer "evil" that is our military-industrial complex, again, let's examine what the world looked like before that establishment reared its ugly head. **The last great period of global structural change was the first half of the 20th century, a period that saw a death toll of about 100 million across two world wars.** That comes to an average of 2 million deaths a year in a world of approximately 2 billion souls. Today, with far more comprehensive worldwide reporting, researchers report an average of less than 100,000 battle deaths annually in a world fast approaching 7 billion people. Though admittedly crude**, these calculations suggest a 90 percent absolute drop and a 99 percent relative drop in deaths due to war. We are clearly headed for a world order characterized by multipolarity,** something the American-birthed system was designed to both encourage and accommodate. **But given how things turned out the last time we collectively faced such a fluid structure, we would do well to keep U.S. power, in all of its forms, deeply embedded in the geometry to come.¶** To continue the historical survey, after salvaging Western Europe from its half-century of civil war, **the U.S. emerged as the progenitor of a new, far more just form of globalization -- one based on actual free trade rather than colonialism.** America then successfully replicated globalization further in East Asia over the second half of the 20th century, **setting the stage for the Pacific Century now unfolding.**

#### 3 Multilateralism is in unstoppable decline

Young et al 13

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The Doha round of trade negotiations is deadlocked, despite eight successful multilateral trade rounds before it. Climate negotiators have met for two decades without finding a way to stem global emissions. The UN is paralyzed in the face of growing insecurities across the world, the latest dramatic example being Syria. Each of these phenomena could be treated as if it was independent, and an explanation sought for the peculiarities of its causes. Yet, such a perspective would fail to show what they, along with numerous other instances of breakdown in international negotiations, have in common. Global cooperation is gridlocked across a range of issue areas. The reasons for this are not the result of any single underlying causal structure, but rather of several underlying dynamics that work together. Global cooperation today is failing not simply because it is very difficult to solve many global problems – indeed it is – but because previous phases of global cooperation have been incredibly successful, producing unintended consequences that have overwhelmed the problem-solving capacities of the very institutions that created them. It is hard to see how this situation can be unravelled, given failures of contemporary global leadership, the weaknesses of NGOs in converting popular campaigns into institutional change and reform, and the domestic political landscapes of the most powerful countries. A golden era of governed globalization In order to understand why gridlock has come about it is important to understand how it was that the post-Second World War era facilitated, in many respects, a successful form of ‘governed globalization’ that contributed to relative peace and prosperity across the world over several decades. This period was marked by peace between the great powers, although there were many proxy wars fought out in the global South. This relative stability created the conditions for what now can be regarded as an unprecedented period of prosperity that characterized the 1950s onward. Although it is by no means the sole cause, the UN is central to this story, helping to create conditions under which decolonization and successive waves of democratization could take root, profoundly altering world politics. While the economic record of the postwar years varies by country, many experienced significant economic growth and living standards rose rapidly across significant parts of the world. By the late 1980s a variety of East Asian countries were beginning to grow at an unprecedented speed, and by the late 1990s countries such as China, India and Brazil had gained significant economic momentum, a process that continues to this day. Meanwhile, the institutionalization of international cooperation proceeded at an equally impressive pace. In 1909, 37 intergovernmental organizations existed; in 2011, the number of institutions and their various off-shoots had grown to 7608 (Union of International Associations 2011). There was substantial growth in the number of international treaties in force, as well as the number of international regimes, formal and informal. At the same time, new kinds of institutional arrangements have emerged alongside formal intergovernmental bodies, including a variety of types of transnational governance arrangements such as networks of government officials, public-private partnerships, as well as exclusively private/corporate bodies. Postwar institutions created the conditions under which a multitude of actors could benefit from forming multinational companies, investing abroad, developing global production chains, and engaging with a plethora of other social and economic processes associated with globalization. These conditions, combined with the expansionary logic of capitalism and basic technological innovation, changed the nature of the world economy, radically increasing dependence on people and countries from every corner of the world. This interdependence, in turn, created demand for further institutionalization, which states seeking the benefits of cooperation provided, beginning the cycle anew. This is not to say that international institutions were the only cause of the dynamic form of globalization experienced over the last few decades. Changes in the nature of global capitalism, including breakthroughs in transportation and information technology, are obviously critical drivers of interdependence. However, all of these changes were allowed to thrive and develop because they took place in a relatively open, peaceful, liberal, institutionalized world order. By preventing World War Three and another Great Depression, the multilateral order arguably did just as much for interdependence as microprocessors or email (see Mueller 1990; O’Neal and Russett 1997). Beyond the special privileges of the great powers Self-reinforcing interdependence has now progressed to the point where it has altered our ability to engage in further global cooperation. That is, economic and political shifts in large part attributable to the successes of the post-war multilateral order are now amongst the factors grinding that system into gridlock. Because of the remarkable success of global cooperation in the postwar order, human interconnectedness weighs much more heavily on politics than it did in 1945. The need for international cooperation has never been higher. Yet the “supply” side of the equation, institutionalized multilateral cooperation, has stalled. In areas such as nuclear proliferation, the explosion of small arms sales, terrorism, failed states, global economic imbalances, financial market instability, global poverty and inequality, biodiversity losses, water deficits and climate change, multilateral and transnational cooperation is now increasingly ineffective or threadbare. Gridlock is not unique to one issue domain, but appears to be becoming a general feature of global governance: cooperation seems to be increasingly difficult and deficient at precisely the time when it is needed most. It is possible to identify four reasons for this blockage, four pathways to gridlock: rising multipolarity, institutional inertia, harder problems, and institutional fragmentation. Each pathway can be thought of as a growing trend that embodies a specific mix of causal mechanisms. Each of these are explained briefly below. Growing multipolarity. The absolute number of states has increased by 300 percent in the last 70 years, meaning that the most basic transaction costs of global governance have grown. More importantly, the number of states that “matter” on a given issue—that is, the states without whose cooperation a global problem cannot be adequately addressed—has expanded by similar proportions. At Bretton Woods in 1945, the rules of the world economy could essentially be written by the United States with some consultation with the UK and other European allies. In the aftermath of the 2008-2009 crisis, the G-20 has become the principal forum for global economic management, not because the established powers desired to be more inclusive, but because they could not solve the problem on their own. However, a consequence of this progress is now that many more countries, representing a diverse range of interests, must agree in order for global cooperation to occur. Institutional inertia.

 The postwar order succeeded, in part, because it incentivized great power involvement in key institutions. From the UN Security Council, to the Bretton Woods institutions, to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, key pillars of the global order explicitly grant special privileges to the countries that were wealthy and powerful at the time of their creation. This hierarchy was necessary to secure the participation of the most important countries in global governance. Today, the gain from this trade-off has shrunk while the costs have grown. As power shifts from West to East, North to South, a broader range of participation is needed on nearly all global issues if they are to be dealt with effectively. At the same time, following decolonization, the end of the Cold War and economic development, the idea that some countries should hold more rights and privileges than others is increasingly (and rightly) regarded as morally bankrupt. And yet, the architects of the postwar order did not, in most cases, design institutions that would organically adjust to fluctuations in national power. Harder problems. As independence has deepened, the types and scope of problems around which countries must cooperate has evolved. Problems are both now more extensive, implicating a broader range of countries and individuals within countries, and intensive, penetrating deep into the domestic policy space and daily life. Consider the example of trade. For much of the postwar era, trade negotiations focused on reducing tariff levels on manufactured products traded between industrialized countries. Now, however, negotiating a trade agreement requires also discussing a host of social, environmental, and cultural subjects - GMOs, intellectual property, health and environmental standards, biodiversity, labour standards—about which countries often disagree sharply. In the area of environmental change a similar set of considerations applies. To clean up industrial smog or address ozone depletion required fairly discrete actions from a small number of top polluters. By contrast, the threat of climate change and the efforts to mitigate it involve nearly all countries of the globe. Yet, the divergence of voice and interest within both the developed and developing worlds, along with the sheer complexity of the incentives needed to achieve a low carbon economy, have made a global deal, thus far, impossible (Falkner et al. 2011; Victor 2011). Fragmentation. The institution-builders of the 1940s began with, essentially, a blank slate. But efforts to cooperate internationally today occur in a dense institutional ecosystem shaped by path dependency. The exponential rise in both multilateral and transnational organizations has created a more complex multilevel and multi-actor system of global governance. Within this dense web of institutions mandates can conflict, interventions are frequently uncoordinated, and all too typically scarce resources are subject to intense competition. In this context, the proliferation of institutions tends to lead to dysfunctional fragmentation, reducing the ability of multilateral institutions to provide public goods. When funding and political will are scarce, countries need focal points to guide policy (Keohane and Martin 1995), which can help define the nature and form of cooperation. Yet, when international regimes overlap, these positive effects are weakened. Fragmented institutions, in turn, disaggregate resources and political will, while increasing transaction costs. In stressing four pathways to gridlock we emphasize the manner in which contemporary global governance problems build up on each other, although different pathways can carry more significance in some domains than in others. The challenges now faced by the multilateral order are substantially different from those faced by the 1945 victors in the postwar settlement. They are second-order cooperation problems arising from previous phases of success in global coordination. Together, they now block and inhibit problem solving and reform at the global level.

#### 5 Alt cause – water scarcity and democracy

Hensel et. al. 6 – their author (Paul R. Hensel, Professor of Political Science at the University of North Texas, PhD in Political Science from the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Sara McLaughlin Mitchell, Professor of Political Science at the University of Iowa, PhD in Political Science from Michigan State University, Thomas E. Sowers II, PhD in Political Science from Florida State University, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Lamar University, “Conflict management of riparian disputes,” Political Geography 25 (2006) pg. 383-411)//javi

In addition to water scarcity and the presence of institutions, we expect that river management will be inﬂuenced by other factors that are less central to our theoretical argument. These include joint democracy, the dyadic power relationship between two potential disputants, the overall salience of the contested river, and recent interactions over the river. Consistent with the democratic peace literature, joint democracy should lessen the likelihood of militarized conﬂict between riparians and increase the likelihood of the use and effectiveness of peaceful conﬂict management.

#### 6 Border violence won’t spillover

Bennion, 09 (Dave, “Border violence not spilling over,” Immigrant Rights, April 18, http://immigration.change.org/blog/view/border\_violence\_not\_spilling\_over)

While the cable news channels have seized on the "spillover violence" from the Mexican drug cartels into border towns like El Paso, gente on the border themselves don't much like the military setting up in their hometowns. I don't have cable TV, but apparently the cable news shows have been covering this story in the usual breathless fashion.  There's just one problem with this from the perspective of the residents of Texas border towns: [there hasn't been significant spillover violence.](http://www.texasobserver.org/article.php?aid=3014) According to the FBI, more than 1,600 people were killed by cartel violence in Juarez in 2008. El Paso, a city of 755,000, recorded just 18 murders last year. Laredo had 11; Brownsville and McAllen had three and nine, respectively. By comparison, Washington, D.C., with a population smaller than El Paso's, had 186 homicides in 2008. . . . The real impact of the ongoing tragedy in Juarez is felt by El Pasoans in more indirect and personal ways. While the brutality across the river has not caused a wave of kidnappings and murders in El Paso, folks do feel its effects every day. Families are divided. El Pasoans can no longer visit their friends, relatives, doctors or dentists in Juarez. Businesses on both sides suffer. The stories are legion: The high-school student who can't visit her beloved, 105-year-old grandmother because her parents don't want to risk her safety. The young Juarez woman who worries that her El Paso friends and relatives won't be able to attend her wedding. And the many families mourning loved ones lost on the other side of the Rio Grande. The media is chasing the ratings boost they believe this story will bring.  But leaders of border towns don't want the attention and the consequences it brings: ever-higher walls through the community, semi-permanent military presence, and in 1997, the shooting of a young American by a Marine. El Paso Mayor John **Cook** spoke about his recent interaction with the media. "I'll speak with them and tell them there hasn't been any spillover of violence into El Paso," he says, "and then they will turn around and report that there is. Mostly I feel like I've wasted my time." He's not the only border mayor who feels that frustration. In March, McAllen Mayor Richard Cortez got into an on-air tussle with CNN anchor Don Lemon. With archival footage of masked soldiers and body bags in Sinaloa, Mexico-960 miles from McAllen-rolling in the background, Lemon informed Cortez what was happening in his city. "I think it's pretty close to a crisis, wouldn't you agree?" Lemon asked. "The crisis is in Mexico," Cortez replied. "It has not spilled over**,** Don, to mine-to our city." "Yes, I know you say that. I know you say that it hasn't," Lemon said. "Since you're the mayor of the city, you have to put the best foot forward. I know your city is affected, but you have to put a good face on it." "I'm not putting my head in the sand," Cortez insisted. "I'm just reporting to you as accurately as I can what has happened." That's some crackerjack reporting!  Episodes like this make clear that the national media--and cable news in particular--will make up the story themselves if the facts don't cooperate. And Washington politicians take their cues from CNN and Fox News, though they should know better by now. One problem, Cook says, is that Washington politicians and national media "don't know how Mexico positively impacts our region"-including the billions in legal trade across the border. "Typically what happens in Washington is that they listen to you, and it sounds like you are getting through to them. Then you leave, and they do whatever it is they planned to do anyway." And as for the drug violence in Mexico, [Matt Kelley](http://criminaljustice.change.org/blog/view/obama_misses_the_point_in_mexico) wishes Barack Obama would address the failure of the decades-long War on Drugs and acknowledge that some form of legalization would go a long way towards reducing the violence.

**7 No resource wars or conflict over scarcity**

**Tetrais 12**, Senior Fellow at Foundation for Strategic Research, (Bruno- Editorial Board at TWQ, July, “The Demise of Ares: The End of War as We Know It?” The Washington Quarterly, Vol 35 Issue 3, p 7-22, T&F Online)

**The invasion of Kuwait may go down in history as being the last great resource war**. **Future resource wars are unlikely**. There are fewer and fewer conquest wars. Between the Westphalia peace and the end of World War II, nearly half of conflicts were fought over territory. Since the end of the Cold War, it has been less than 30 percent.61 The invasion of Kuwait—a nationwide bank robbery—may go down in history as being the last great resource war. The U.S.-led intervention of 1991 was partly driven by the need to maintain the free flow of oil, but not by the temptation to capture it. (Nor was the 2003 war against Iraq motivated by oil.) As for the current tensions between the two Sudans over oil, they are the remnants of a civil war and an offshoot of a botched secession process, not a desire to control new resources.¶ China's and India's energy needs are sometimes seen with apprehension: in light of growing oil and gas scarcity, is there not a risk of military clashes over the control of such resources? This seemingly consensual idea rests on two fallacies. One is that there is such a thing as oil and gas scarcity, a notion challenged by many energy experts.62 As prices rise, previously untapped reserves and non-conventional hydrocarbons become economically attractive. The other is that spilling blood is a rational way to access resources. As shown by the work of historians and political scientists such as Quincy Wright, the economic rationale for war has always been overstated. And because of globalization, it has become cheaper to buy than to steal. We no longer live in the world of 1941, when fear of lacking oil and raw materials was a key motivation for Japan's decision to go to war. In an era of liberalizing trade, many natural resources are fungible goods. (Here, Beijing behaves as any other actor: 90 percent of the oil its companies produce outside of China goes to the global market, not to the domestic one.)63 There may be clashes or conflicts in regions in maritime resource-rich areas such as the South China and East China seas or the Mediterranean, but they will be driven by nationalist passions, not the desperate hunger for hydrocarbons.¶ Only in civil wars does the question of resources such as oil, diamonds, minerals, and the like play a significant role; this was especially true as Cold War superpowers stopped their financial patronage of local actors.64 Indeed, as Mueller puts it in his appropriately titled The Remnants of War, “Many [existing wars] have been labeled ‘new war,’ ‘ethnic conflict,’ or, most grandly ‘clashes of civilization.’ But in fact, most…are more nearly opportunistic predation by packs, often remarkably small ones, of criminals, bandits, and thugs.”65 It is the abundance of resources, not their scarcity, which fuels such conflicts. The risk is particularly high when the export of natural resources represents at least a third of the country's GDP.66¶ What about fighting for arable land, in light of population growth in Africa and Asia? Even in situations of high population densities, the correlation between the lack of arable lands and propensity to collective violence remains weak.67 Neo-Malthusians such as Jared Diamond believe that the Rwanda tragedy was driven by such scarcity.68 But there was no famine in Rwanda at the time. And the events of 1994 were not a revolt of the poor: Hutu landowners were amongst the most active perpetrators of genocide. There was, however, a significant youth bulge: the 15–24 age group represented 38 percent of the adult population.69 Land scarcity played a role, but at best as a factor explaining the intensity of the violence in some areas.70

### 1nc – ofac

#### 1 Sanctions are easing now in favor of diplomacy, this solves the advantage—Our turns are unique

Landler 10-17-13. Mark Landler, 10-17-13“White House Weighs Easing Iran Sanctions’ Bite With Slow Release of Assets” [http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/18/world/middleeast/white-house-weighs-easing-sanctions-on-iran-with-tapered-release-of-assets.html?\_r=0][MG]

WASHINGTON — The Obama administration, in the wake of a promising first round of nuclear diplomacy with Iran, is weighing a proposal to ease the pain of sanctions on Tehran by offering it access to billions of dollars in frozen funds if the Iranian government takes specific steps to curb its nuclear program, a senior administration official said Thursday. Such a plan, under which the United States could free up Iran’s frozen overseas assets in installments, would avoid the political and diplomatic risks of repealing the sanctions, which had been agreed to by a diverse coalition of countries, the official said. It would also give President Obama the flexibility to respond to Iranian offers that emerge from the negotiations without unraveling the global sanctions regime the administration has spent years cobbling together. The official likened the plan, which is still being debated inside the White House and the State Department, to opening and closing a financial spigot. While the two days of talks in Geneva this week did not produce a breakthrough, Iranian officials were more candid and substantive than in previous diplomatic encounters, officials said, particularly in direct negotiations between Iranian diplomats and the senior American representative, Wendy R. Sherman. Now, though, the administration faces a complex calculation on the future of the sanctions, which have been crucial in bringing the Iranians back to the bargaining table. Administration officials said they would urge the Senate to hold off on voting on a new bill to strangle Iran’s oil exports further until after the next round of talks on Nov. 7.

#### 2 No Iran prolif – mindset shift cause Iran to be emboldened by sanctions

Roberts and Borger 9/27/13 – Guardian's Washington Bureau chief, covering politics and US national affairs. Previously, he worked as the national editor in London and was head of business, Guardian's diplomatic editor. He was previously a correspondent in the US, the Middle East, eastern Europe and the Balkans (Dan and Julian, “Obama holds historic phone call with Rouhani and hints at end to sanctions”, The Guardian, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/27/obama-phone-call-iranian-president-rouhani)//javi

Barack Obama and Hassan Rouhani held the first direct talks between American and Iranian leaders since the 1979 Islamic revolution, exchanging pleasantries in a 15-minute telephone call on Friday that raised the prospect of relief for Tehran from crippling economic sanctions. Speaking at the White House shortly after the historic call, Obama said his discussion with Rouhani had shown the "basis for resolution" of the dispute over Iran nuclear programme. The conversation, in which Obama communicated his "deep respect for the Iranian people", capped a week of diplomatic breakthroughs. Rouhani ended a five-day visit to New York for the UN general assembly with a striking offer to work rapidly to defuse tensions with America, and hailed the US as "a great nation" – a dramatic shift in tone for an Iranian leader. Both leaders expressed confidence their countries could reach a peaceful settlement to their standoff over Iranian nuclear programme. Obama, in his White House statement, said: "While there will be significant obstacles and success is by no means guaranteed, I believe we can reach a comprehensive solution. I do believe that there is a basis for a resolution." Obama cautioned against over-optimism, however. "We're mindful of all the challenges ahead," he told reporters. "The test will be meaningful, transparent and verifiable actions which can also bring relief from the comprehensive international sanctions that are currently in place." Minutes earlier, President Rouhani's English-language Twitter account broke news of the phone call in a series of tweets that hinted at a remarkably swift rapprochement between the two countries since the moderate cleric was elected in June. The tweets were deleted several hours later and replaced with more sombre versions. One tweet said Rouhani had concluded the phone call by telling Obama to "have a nice day!" and Obama had thanked him and said goodbye in Persian – "Khodahafez", which means "God go with you". That tweet was later deleted and replaced: The tweets, which were published by Rouhani's aides, suggested the tone of the conversation was friendly, even punctuated by banter. Obama was quoted as saying: "I wish you a safe and pleasant journey and apologize if you're experiencing the [horrendous] traffic in NYC." Earlier, at a press conference in New York, Rouhani made the most conciliatory remarks heard from Tehran in a decade and also offered to prepare a concrete plan for resolving the nuclear stalemate to a new round of negotiations in Geneva on 15 October. He said Tehran might go even further, hinting at a possible confidence-building measure to be announced at the talks. But it was Rouhani's tone that was most remarkable, at the end of a week in which he sought to present Iran as a reborn country, following his June election.

#### 3 Sanctions fail which turns the aff

Keck, 13 - is associate editor of The Diplomat (Zachary, 9-27, “Iran: The Case for Rapprochement” http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/iran-the-case-rapprochement-9139)djm

For nearly thirty-five years, Iran and the United States have stumbled into numerous conflicts and crises with each other, in some cases—such as post-2003 Iraq—even when their interests were seemingly aligned. They now appear, not for the first time, to be stumbling toward peace. This is a positive development, but to succeed a concerted effort must be made to define a proper endgame. In particular, the United States must define its endgame as a genuine U.S.-Iranian rapprochement, rather than a narrow nuclear deal in which Iran agrees to limits on its nuclear program in exchange for sanctions relief. Such a nuclear deal is undoubtedly necessary for a larger rapprochement to take hold, but not sufficient in and of itself. Making U.S.-Iranian rapprochement the endgame will be especially crucial for getting Iranian buy-in for a deal on the nuclear program. Currently, the thinking in the West is that U.S. and EU sanctions targeting Iranian oil exports have caused enough pain to force Iranian leaders to agree to a narrow nuclear deal. This fails to recognize that the sanctions affect certain elite groups within Iran differently. Although President Hassan Rouhani may have a political interest in securing sanctions relief, many of the Iranian hardliners who are predisposed to act as a spoiler in U.S.-Iranian negotiations actually benefit from the sanctions regime. The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), for example, operates a massive smuggling network that international sanctions make all the more lucrative. Meanwhile, hardline clerics like Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati, Mohammad Taqi Mesbah-Yazdi and possibly Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei himself, fear the gravitational pull of the freer flow of non-Islamic ideas. Furthermore, nearly all Iranian leaders doubt that the current standoff with the United States is actually over nuclear weapons. They point to the fact that the United States and Iran were at odds long before concerns over its nuclear program surfaced. Instead, they argue the United States is simply using the nuclear issue to win greater international support for its pressure campaign against Iran. As Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has explained: “The movement [against Iran] is not just a nuclear movement. Today their pretext is the nuclear issue. They use the nuclear pretext to impose sanctions on us. How long is it since the nuclear issue was first brought up? The sanctions have been there for thirty years. Why were they imposing sanctions on us when the nuclear issue did not exist?” The implication of this is that Iranian leaders believe that if they resolve the nuclear issue, the United States will just find another way to try and undermine the Iranian regime. The example of Muammar Gaddafi is particularly potent in this regard. Iranian leaders understandably fear ending up like the former Libyan leader in that they surrender their nuclear program for sanctions relief, only to find the West continues to hold an antagonist position towards them. The bottom line is that unless the political dynamics of the U.S.-Iranian relationship are changed, Iranian leaders will be wary of putting significant limits on their nuclear program. Fortunately, the United States has an equally strong interest in achieving a rapprochement with Iran. The overlap in U.S.-Iranian interests is often discussed in the context of Afghanistan. There is good reason for this; namely, both sides have congruent interests in the country and this fact, along with Iran’s proximity to Afghanistan, would make it a valuable asset in shoring up the Afghan government following NATO’s withdrawal, or at worst minimizing the fallout if the Taliban seizes power in southern Afghanistan. Not only would Iran be able to lend its own support for U.S. efforts in Afghanistan, but it would act as a force multiplier in at least three crucial ways. First, it would give the United States a route into (or out of) Afghanistan, irrespective of Pakistan. Second, a U.S.-Iranian rapprochement would give India a freer hand in using Iran as a conduit to project its own power

and influence in Afghanistan. Thirdly, Iran’s shared border with Pakistan’s already unstable Balochistan Province could be used as leverage in deterring Islamabad’s destabilizing activities in Afghanistan. Completing the Iran-Pakistan natural gas pipeline would further increase Tehran’s leverage over Islamabad. A rapprochement with Iran would also greatly enhance America’s ability to influence events in the Middle East. The United States has recently been suffering from a deficit of influence in the region mainly because it lacks sources of leverage. The past decade has shown that Washington doesn’t understand the region’s messy politics, and this failure has constrained its ability to harness its superior military force to secure political ends in the Middle East. Additionally, as the coup in Egypt this summer made abundantly clear, U.S. economic aid will rarely be decisive by itself given the oil wealth of Persian Gulf states. Thus, with the exception of advanced military technology, the United States isn’t holding many cards in its Middle Eastern hand at the moment. A rapprochement with Iran would change these dynamics virtually overnight, once again making the United States the “indispensable power” in the Middle East. This is because it would place the United States in the unique and enviable position of maintaining strong ties to all the major sides—the Sunnis, Shi’as and Israelis— of an increasingly divided region. The solution to every major issue in the Middle East would run through Washington. Consider that, if a U.S.-Iranian rapprochement had predated the outbreak of the Syrian civil war, the United States would have been well positioned to negotiate a political settlement that excluded Bashar al-Assad and Al Qaeda. If unusually lucky, Vladimir Putin would have at most managed to sneak into the photos of the deal being signed. There is precedent for this; by engaging Israel’s adversaries following the 1973 Yom Kippur War, Henry Kissinger was able to all but eliminate the Soviet Union as a political factor in the Middle East. No country benefitted more from this than Israel, which has yet to go to war with an Arab national army since, and indeed has signed peace agreements with many of its former adversaries. When Egypt was a Soviet ally, this would have been unthinkable. A U.S.-Iranian rapprochement is likely to have similar implications for Israel. Currently Tehran pays no price for its intransigence towards Israel. An alliance with the United States would change this by giving Iran more to lose in unnecessarily antagonizing Israel than it currently gains from doing so. Even if an explicit peace between Iran and Israel was not forthcoming, Iran’s antagonist actions towards Israel would drop off precipitously. The Iranian nuclear threat to Israel would also vanish. This would free up Israeli leaders to concentrate on challenges closer to home, such as the rising power of Sunni Islamist parties in neighboring countries, many of which coincidentally also threaten Iran. In turn, eliminating the Iran threat would put the United States on stronger grounds to push for a two state solution, should it choose to continue doing so. The United States would also benefit economically from a rapprochement with Iran. Not only would it open up a market for American exports, but decades of sanctions have left Iran’s infrastructure in desperate need of investment. The United States would be well positioned to capitalize on these investments, particularly in developing Iran’s much-underutilized oil and natural-gas potential. American companies would also be able to build pipelines to ship oil and natural gas from the Caucasus and Central Asia to markets in Asia and Europe via the Persian Gulf. The U.S. policy of trying to create a twenty-first century Silk Road to stabilize Afghanistan would also be furthered by removing U.S. opposition to the North-South Transport Corridor, of which Iran is a crucial part. Having Iran as an ally would also strengthen America’s hand vis-à-vis China. To begin with, after 2014 the United States’ considerable military assets in the Middle East will almost all be geared towards containing Iran. A rapprochement with Iran would therefore free up important resources for the Pacific theatre. Moreover, China’s growing engagement in Central Asia, southern Iraq, Turkey, Afghanistan and Pakistan is slowly encircling Iran. This is almost certain to create greater tensions between Iran and China in the years ahead. For instance, Beijing taking possession of the Gwadar port in southwestern Pakistan appears designed to give China the option of someday dominating the Strait of Hormuz and Persian Gulf, which will be crucial to protecting its growing investments in Middle Eastern energy. Iran has long opposed an extra-regional power dominating these waters, and it is the only country standing between Gwadar Port and China’s growing presence in Iraq and the Persian Gulf. The United States and Iran have a crucial overlapping interest in checking China’s inroads in these areas, and each side’s ability to do so will be enhanced through cooperation. By contrast, a continuation of U.S. policy towards Iran could very well force Tehran into a dependent relationship with China, enabling rather than checking China’s encroachment on its strategic interests. In short, by making rapprochement with Iran its explicit endgame, the United States will increase the likelihood of reaching a negotiated settlement over Tehran’s nuclear program, while also furthering many other important U.S. interests. It would be the exact type of shrewd diplomacy that made the United States the indispensable power in the first place, but has been conspicuously absent from American policy for much of the post–Cold War era.

## 2nc

### 2nc – solvency

#### Anti-american sentiment outweighs

Suchlicki, 13 (JAIME, “Why Cuba Will Still Be Anti-American After Castro,” JAIME SUCHLICKI is Emilio Bacardi Moreau Professor of History **¶** and International Studies and the Director of the Institute for Cuban **¶** and Cuban-American Studies at the University of Miami. He was the **¶** founding Executive Director of the North-South Center. For the past **¶** decade he was also the editor of the prestigious Journal of **¶** Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, <http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/03/why-cuba-will-still-be-anti-american-after-castro/273680/>)

Similarly, any serious overtures to the U.S. do not seem likely in the near future. It would mean the rejection of one of Fidel Castro's main legacies: anti-Americanism. It may create uncertainty within the government, leading to frictions and factionalism. It would require the weakening of Cuba's anti-American alliance with radical regimes in Latin America and elsewhere.¶ Raul is unwilling to renounce the support and close collaboration of countries like Venezuela, China, Iran and Russia in exchange for an uncertain relationship with the United States. At a time that anti-Americanism is strong in Latin America and the Middle East, Raul's policies are more likely to remain closer to regimes that are not particularly friendly to the United States and that demand little from Cuba in return for generous aid.

Cuba fears regime change

Hanson and Lee, 13 - is associate director and coordinating editor at CFR AND is the Senior Production Editor of CFR (Stephanie and Brianna, “U.S.-Cuba Relations” http://www.cfr.org/cuba/us-cuba-relations/p11113)djm

A fundamental incompatibility of political views stands in the way of improving U.S.-Cuban relations, experts say. While experts say the United States wants regime change, "the most important objective of the Cuban government is to remain in power at all costs," says Felix Martin, an assistant professor at Florida International University's Cuban Research Institute. Fidel Castro has been an inspiration for Latin American leftists such as Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez and Bolivian President Evo Morales, who have challenged U.S. policy in the region.

#### This year will mark 22 straight years of those nations opposing the embargo – disproves all of their impacts

CDA, 13 – Center for Democracy in the Americas (10-11, “CUBA CENTRAL Newsblast: Dumb-Bargo- UN Report Says U.S. Sanctions Cost Cuban People Food and Jobs” http://www.democracyinamericas.org/blog-post/dumb-bargo-un-report-says-u-s-sanctions-cost-cuban-people-food-and-jobs/)djm

On October 29th, UN General Assembly will vote on a resolution to condemn the U.S. embargo of Cuba, and we can say with confidence the outcome is not in doubt. The U.S. has lost this vote twenty-one years in a row. Last year, as Reuters reported, the resolution was adopted by an overwhelming margin. 188 member states voted against the U.S. Only Israel and Palau stood with us. Micronesia and The Marshall Islands could not decide whether they supported or opposed the embargo and so they abstained. Today, we can say with certainty the UN will pass this resolution again, and the U.S. will get its “clock cleaned” for the 22nd consecutive year. Already, 147 member states plus the European Union, representing 28 other nations, have filed written reports with the Secretary General, indicating they oppose the embargo, and do not have rules that limit their diplomatic or economic relations with Cuba as U.S. law insists they must do. We’ve read a compilation of the reports to the U.N. Secretary General by member states and also by UN agencies that discuss the impact of the embargo on their programs. Year after year, certain things catch our attention. No nation that supports the embargo – not the U.S., Israel, or Palau – publishes a word in Secretary General’s report defending the policy. The Holy See – The Vatican – states for the record it has “never drawn up or applied economic, commercial or financial laws or measures against Cuba.” All of Latin America is against the policy. Brazil, joining close U.S. allies like Colombia and Mexico, discusses how it is vigorously cultivating a closer economic relationship with Cuba. El Salvador suggests the U.S. is living in the past, saying the embargo “continues to call to mind a chapter of history that we would all wish to bring to a close once and for all.”

### 2nc – multilat

**Hegemony is vital Japanese foreign protection**

**Thayer, ‘7** – Professor of Political Science at the University of Minnesota

[Bradley A. American Empire: A Debate. Routledge Press: Taylor and Francis Group, NY. Page # below in < >]

Third, our allies like Australia, Great Britain, Japan, Kuwait, Israel, and Thailand are protected by American military might and so we are able to deter attacks against them. They are aligned with the United States, and thus under its "security umbrella"—any attack on those states would be met by the military power of the United States. Other states know this and, usually, that is sufficient to deter aggression against the allies of the United States. <16>

**Extinction**

**Ratner 03**

[Ellen, 1/17. World Net Daily Executive Report]

Experts predict that with Japan's high-tech, industrial economy, they could assemble a full nuclear arsenal and bomb delivery systems within three years. This would be a disaster. Not only would it trigger a new, intra-Asian arms race—for who could doubt that if Japan goes nuclear, China and North Korea would be joined by South Korea and even Taiwan in building new and more weapons? Likewise, given the memories, who could doubt that such a scenario increases the risks of nuclear war somewhere in the region? By comparison, the old Cold War world, where there were only two armed camps, would look like kid stuff.

#### Heg makes multilateralism effective but not the other way around

Beaver 4/24- Kathryn, BA in Government, The College of William and Mary (“United States Foreign Policy and Multilateral Institutional

Effectiveness”, April 24, 2013 https://digitalarchive.wm.edu/bitstream/handle/10288/18178/KathrynBeaver2013\_text.pdf?sequence=2\\CLans)

However, scholars with a more realist inclination, like Robert Gilpin, do not ground their claims in economic logic, but argue that a dominant state will shape the order suited only to their interests at weaker states‘ expense. The theory of hegemonic stability has been useful for realist scholars, not because it claims that hegemony is necessary for cooperation, but because it frames the structure of institutional systems in light of the preferences of a powerful state.6 Hegemonic stability theory has evolved beyond the issues of free trade and optimal tariffs. The ability of states to cooperate with each other on a variety of global issues could be influenced by a hegemon willing to enforce rules or provide public goods, thereby affecting the strength of international agreements and subsequent organizations. Indeed, a hegemon could incur benefits by choosing a multilateral forum in order to solve a problem. Cooperation could benefit a hegemon in a variety of ways. First, it can reduce transaction costs of interacting with weaker states. It would be more costly to negotiate several bilateral treaties instead of just one multilateral agreement. The hegemon could also structure a forum that would allow other states to have a say, therefore reducing the likelihood that a significant challenger would arise out of conflicts of interest. Finally, by dispersing decision-making power to others, the hegemon is protecting itself from a major shift in power leading to further stability.7 Because of these benefits, a hegemon might prefer cooperation and would ensure its continuation.

**Heg is key to free trade solves protectionism and resource wars**

**Schwarz, ‘96** – Correspondent for The Atlantic Monthly

[Benjamin, “Why America thinks it has to run the world,” The Atlantic Monthly, Vol.277, Iss. 6, pg. 92-100, June, Proquest]

America's foreign policy has been based on a hybrid of Lenin's and Kautsky's analyses. It has aimed at the unified, liberalized international capitalist community Kautsky envisioned. But the global role that the United States has undertaken to sustain that community is determined by a worldview very close to Lenin's. To Washington, Baker's "global liberal economic regime" cannot be maintained simply by an internationalized economic elite's desire for it to exist; it can be maintained **only by American power.** Thus, in explaining its global strategy in 1993, in its "post-Cold War" defense strategy, the Pentagon defined the creation of "a prosperous, largely democratic, market-oriented zone of peace and prosperity that encompasses more than two-thirds of the world's economy" as "perhaps our nation's most significant achievement since the Second World War"--not the victory over Moscow. And it declared that this global capitalist order required the "stability" that only American "leadership" could provide. Ultimately, of course, U.S. policymakers and Lenin diverge. Although Lenin recognized that any given international political order was by its nature impermanent, America's foreign-policy strategists have hoped to keep the reality of international politics permanently at bay.

**Unilateralism is affordable**

**Thayer 07** – Professor of Political Science at the University of Minnesota

[Bradley A. American Empire: A Debate. Routledge Press: Taylor and Francis Group, NY. Page # below in < >]

No other country, or group of countries, comes close to matching the defense spending of the United States. Table 1.3 provides a context for this defense spending through a comparison of the defense spending of major countries in 2004, according the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). The United States is far ahead of the defense spending of all other countries, including its nearest competitor, China. This is by design. As former Speaker of the House of Representatives Newt Gingrich has argued, "You do not need today's defense budget to defend the United States. You need today's defense budget to lead the world. If you are prepared to give up leading the world, you can have a much smaller defense budget." To maintain the robust American lead in military capabilities, it must continue to spend large, but absolutely affordable, sums.¶ And it is affordable. While the amount of U.S. defense spending certainly is a large sum, it is only about 4 percent of its gross domestic product, as Table 1.3 illustrates. An examination of the data in the table is remarkable for four reasons. First, U.S. defense spending is about half of the world's total defense spending. Second, the United States spends more than almost all the other major military powers in the world combined. Of course, most of those major military powers are also allies of the United States. Third, U.S. defense spending is very low when measured as a percentage of its economy, about 3.7 percent of its total economy. Fourth, defense spending at that level is easily affordable for the United States into the future.¶ In fact, in absolute real terms, the United States spends about 10 percent more on defense than it did during the Cold War. If we examine the history of defense spending during the Cold War, only in fiscal years 1946, 1951-1953, 1967-1969, 1983-1990 did the United States spend more on defense when measured in fiscal year 2005 dollars.0 And because the U.S. economy was smaller, the defense spending burden was greater in those years; it is much less now. Nor is the burden of military service too great for the American people to bear. As Table 1.3 demonstrates, there are only about 1.5 million people in uniform, out of a population of 300 million, or approximately 0.5 percent of the population. In comparison, during World War II, when the U.S. population numbered some 140 million, about 13 million people, or nearly 9 percent of the population, were in uniform.' <14>

**Multilateralism isn’t any cheaper**

**Brookies, Ikenberry, and Wohlforth 13** (Stephen Brooks, John Ikenberry and William Wohlforth, Jan/Feb 2013, Foreign Affairs, (Brooks is a professor at Darmouth, Ikenberry is a professor at Princeton and Wohlforth is a professor at Dartmouth), "Lean forward: in defense of american engagement," 92.1, Proquest)

Many advocates of retrenchment consider the United States' assertive global posture simply too expensive. The international relations scholar Christopher Layne, for example, has warned of the country's "ballooning budget deficits" and argued that "its strategic commitments exceed the resources available to support them." Calculating the savings of switching grand strategies, however, is not so simple, because it depends on the expenditures the current strategy demands and the amount required for its replacement-numbers that are hard to pin down.¶ If the United States revoked all its security guarantees, brought home all its troops, shrank every branch of the military, and slashed its nuclear arsenal, it would save around $900 billion over ten years, according to Benjamin Friedman and Justin Logan of the Cato Institute. But few advocates of retrenchment endorse such a radical reduction; instead, most call for "restraint," an "offshore balancing" strategy, or an "over the horizon" military posture. The savings these approaches would yield are less clear, since they depend on which security commitments Washington would abandon outright and how much it would cost to keep the remaining ones. If retrenchment simply meant shipping foreign-based U.S. forces back to the United States, then the savings would be modest at best, since the countries hosting U.S. forces usually cover a large portion of the basing costs. And if it meant maintaining a major expeditionary capacity, then any savings would again be small, since the Pentagon would still have to pay for the expensive weaponry and equipment required for projecting power abroad.¶ The other side of the cost equation, the price of continued engagement, is also in flux. Although the fat defense budgets of the past decade make an easy target for advocates of retrenchment, such high levels of spending aren't needed to maintain an engaged global posture. Spending skyrocketed after 9/11, but it has already begun to fall back to earth as the United States winds down its two costly wars and trims its base level of nonwar spending. As of the fall of 2012, the Defense Department was planning for cuts of just under $500 billion over the next five years, which it maintains will not compromise national security. These reductions would lower military spending to a little less than three percent of gdp by 2017, from its current level of 4.5 percent. The Pentagon could save even more with no ill effects by reforming its procurement practices and compensation policies.¶ Even without major budget cuts, however, the country can afford the costs of its ambitious grand strategy. The significant increases in military spending proposed by Mitt Romney, the Republican candidate, during the 2012 presidential campaign would still have kept military spending below its current share of gdp, since spending on the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq would still have gone down and Romney's proposed nonwar spending levels would not have kept pace with economic growth. Small wonder, then, that the case for pulling back rests more on the nonmonetary costs that the current strategy supposedly incurs.

**The cost of being a hegemony has gotten cheaper and a strong economy allows us to pay for overstretch**

**Thayer 07** – Professor of Political Science at the University of Minnesota

[Bradley A. American Empire: A Debate. Routledge Press: Taylor and Francis Group, NY. Page # below in < >]

Reflecting on the history of world politics, Kennedy submits that the United States not only has overwhelming dominance but possesses such power so as to be a historically unique condition: "Nothing has ever existed like this disparity of power; nothing. I have returned to all of the comparative defense spending and military personnel statistics over the past 500 years that I compiled in The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, and no other nation comes close," not even an empire as great as the British, because "even the Royal Navy was equal only to the next two navies. Right now all the other navies in the world combined could not dent American maritime supremacy."" Moreover, Kennedy recognizes that the steady economic growth of the American economy, and the curbing of inflation, means that "America's enormous defense expenditures could be pursued at a far lower relative cost to the country than the military spending of Ronald Reagan's years," and that fact is "an incomparable source of the U.S. strength."¶ When Kennedy, who was perhaps the strongest skeptic of the economic foundation of America's power, comes to acknowledge, first, that no previous empire has been as powerful as America is now; and, second, that its strength will last because of the fundamental soundness of its economy, then, as Jeff Foxworthy would say, "You might be an empire...." And it is one that will last a considerable amount of time. As with its military might, the economic foundation of the American empire is sound for the projected future.

**The US try to be a hegemon no matter what**

**Mearsheimer 11** John J. Mearsheimer, the “R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago” Jan/Feb 2011 “Imperial By Design” http://mearsheimer.uchicago.edu/pdfs/A0059.pdf

The downward spiral the United States has taken was anything but inevitable. Washington has always had a choice in how to approach grand strategy. One popular option among some libertarians is isolationism. This approach is based on the assumption that there is no region outside the Western Hemisphere that is strategically important enough to justify expending American blood and treasure. Isolationists believe that the United States is remarkably secure because it is separated from all of the world’s great powers by two giant moats—the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans— and on top of that it has had nuclear weapons—the ultimate deterrent—since 1945. But in truth, **there is really no chance that Washington will adopt this policy**, though the United States had strong isolationist tendencies until World War II. For since then, an internationalist activism, fostered by the likes of the Rockefeller Foundation, has thoroughly delegitimized this approach. American policy makers have come to believe the country should be militarily involved on the world stage. Yet though no mainstream politician would dare advocate isolationism at this point, the rationale for this grand strategy shows just how safe the United States is. This means, among other things, that it will always be a challenge to motivate the U.S. public to want to run the world and especially to fight wars of choice in distant places. Offshore balancing, which was America’s traditional grand strategy for most of its history, is but another option. Predicated on the belief that there are three regions of the world that are strategically important to the United States—Europe, Northeast Asia and the Persian Gulf—it sees the United States’ principle goal as making sure no country dominates any of these areas as it dominates the Western Hemisphere. This is to ensure that dangerous rivals in other regions are forced to concentrate their attention on great powers in their own backyards rather than be free to interfere in America’s. The best way to achieve that end is to rely on local powers to counter aspiring regional hegemons and otherwise keep U.S. military forces over the horizon. But if that proves impossible, American troops come from offshore to help do the job, and then leave once the potential hegemon is checked. Selective engagement also assumes that Europe, Northeast Asia and the Persian Gulf are the only areas of the world where the United States should be willing to deploy its military might. It is a more ambitious strategy than offshore balancing in that it calls for permanently stationing U.S. troops in those regions to help maintain peace. For selective engagers, it is not enough just to thwart aspiring hegemons. It is also necessary to prevent war in those key regions, either because upheaval will damage our economy or because we will eventually get dragged into the fight in any case. An American presence is also said to be valuable for limiting nuclear proliferation. But none of these strategies call for Washington to spread democracy around the globe—especially through war. The root cause of America’s troubles is that it adopted a flawed grand strategy after the Cold War. From the Clinton administration on, the United States rejected all these other avenues, instead pursuing global dominance, or what might alternatively be called global hegemony, which was not just doomed to fail, but likely to backfire in dangerous ways if it relied too heavily on military force to achieve its ambitious agenda. Global dominance has two broad objectives: maintaining American primacy, which means making sure that the United States remains the most powerful state in the international system; and spreading democracy across the globe, in effect, making the world over in America’s image. The underlying belief is that new liberal democracies will be peacefully inclined and pro-American, so the more the better. Of course, this means that Washington must care a lot about every country’s politics. With global dominance, no serious attempt is made to prioritize U.S. interests, because they are virtually limitless. This grand strategy is “imperial” at its core; its proponents believe that the United States has the right as well as the responsibility to interfere in the politics of other countries. One would think that such arrogance might alienate other states, but most American policy makers of the early nineties and beyond were confident that would not happen, instead believing that other countries—save for so-called rogue states like Iran and North Korea—would see the United States as a benign hegemon serving their own interests.

#### Multilateralism doesn’t solve resource failures – it fails just as much

Naim 13, Senior Fellow International Economics at Carnegie, 2-15-’13 (Moises, “The G20 is a Sad Sign of Our Uncooperative World” http://www.carnegieendowment.org/2013/02/15/g20-is-sad-sign-of-our-uncooperative-world/fgvs)

The reality is that, despite many commitments by national leaders, the capacity of nation-states to co-ordinate their responses has dwindled. Problems may have gone global but the politics of solving them are as local as ever. It is hard for governments to devote resources to problems beyond their national borders and to work with other nations to address these challenges – while painful problems at home remain unsolved. The changing landscape of global politics also plays a role. As the number and the interests of those sitting at the tables where agreements are negotiated have increased, the opportunities for consensus and concerted action have shrunk. Emerging powers such as the Brics (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa), new international coalitions, and influential nongovernmental players are now demanding a say in the way the world handles its collective problems. Inevitably, when all these disparate and often conflicting interests need to be incorporated into any agreement, the resulting solutions fall short of what is needed to solve the problem. This is why global multilateral agreements in which a large number of countries deliver on co-ordinated commitments have become increasingly rare. When was the last time you heard that an agreement with concrete consequences was reached by a large majority of the world’s nations? I think it was 13 years ago – the Millennium Development Goals. Since then, almost all international summits have yielded meagre results, most visibly those seeking to advance the global agendas on trade liberalisation and curbing global warming. This gap between the growing need for joint international action and the declining ability of nations to act together may be the world’s most dangerous deficit. In economics, when demand outstrips supply prices go up. In geopolitics the inability of nations to satisfy the demand for solutions to problems that transcend national boundaries results in dangerous instability. Pirates hijacking ships off the coast of Somalia, financial crashes that spread internationally at great speed, overfishing, the exploitation of the rainforest and nuclear proliferation are just a few well-known examples on the long list of problems that need international co-operation.

#### Multilat fails – international coop impossible on key issues

Spoerri 13, Host of Ethics Matter at Carnegie Council, 2-25-’13 (Marlene, “Global Ethics Corner: Is Multilateralism Dead?” http://www.carnegiecouncil.org/studio/multimedia/20130225/index.html#section-26501)

Global problems need global solutions. Just ask members of the G-20 or the United Nations. Both groups were founded on the assumption that multilateral cooperation is key to solving major international challenges. There's just one problem. Multilateralism isn't working. The last global agreement that included specific commitments and concrete benchmarks was the Millennium Development Goals. That was passed in the year 2000. Since then, multilateral summits like Doha and Davos have amounted to lots of promises, but little action. Which is why a growing number of analysts are questioning the merits of multilateralism and advocating something called "mini-lateralism." Proponents of "mini-laterialism" say multilateral negotiations have grown too inclusive. They warn that new actors like the BRICS and NGOs like Oxfam have made the search for common ground on contentious global issues impossible. More players mean more conflicts and ultimately, less consensus. So "mini-lateralists" recommend restricting the number of negotiators to those countries actually capable of enacting policy change. In other words, major world powers. It’s that last point that has outraged critics. They say "mini-laterialism" is unethical and anti-democratic. Take the issue of climate change. Multilateral negotiations currently include small countries like the Maldives. As an island state, the Maldives will be one of the chief beneficiaries—or losers—of any climate agreement. But since it doesn't have much geostrategic power, minilateralists would exclude the Maldives from negotiations. Critics say that's unjust. Proponents of "mini-laterialism" make a different ethical argument, however. When it comes to tackling global challenges, they say we have to sacrifice fairness for the greater good. After all, an undemocratic deal on a subject as important as climate change is better than no deal at all. As analysts debate the failings of current international negotiations, what do you think? Is multilateralism in peril? Does mini-lateralism offer an ethical alternative?

**Be skeptical of their evidence – there’s incentives to inflate their claims**

Arana, 09 (Gabriel, Intern writer at The Nation and Graduate Student at Cornell University, “The border violence myth,” The Nation, June 8, http://www.thenation.com/article/border-violence-myth?page=full)

Melissa del Bosque, the journalist who originally reported on media misreprentation of US drug violence for the Texas Observer, attributed the appearance of sensationalistic stories to a number of factors, among them the agendas of what she has called "border-warrior politicians" who use neologisms like "narco-terrorism" in calling for the border to be militarized; the change in administrations; and budgeting concerns. The formation of local, state and national budgets at the beginning of the year provides an opportunity for politicians to exaggerate the threat posed by Mexican drug cartels and thereby receive more funding for local police forces, del Bosque said. Indeed, Texas Homeland Security Director Steve McCraw [stressed that the spillover had already occurred](http://www.elpasotimes.com/newupdated/ci_11770847) in asking state lawmakers to approve a $135 million increase in funding requested by Texas Governor Rick Perry. In Arizona, police readily admitted to the Arizona Daily Star that they welcomed more money. The motive for exaggerating the effect of drug-related violence is not just monetary, though. "There are a lot of conservative legislators who want to look tough on border security," del Bosque said. Even a cursory online search bears out what del Bosque surmises: conservative commentators and politicians have used the news to call for tightened border security, in some cases even calling for the border to be "militarized." For example, Fox News' Sean Hannity recently warned that "the effect on our country may be just beginning" before telling viewers to shield their children's eyes from the Mexican drug-violence footage that followed. He was not alone--as he did in the segment--in conflating US and Mexican drug-related violence. Del Bosque and other journalists who report on and live near the border criticized the simplistic characterization of life there by the national media, one informed by "Wild West" and drug-movie caricatures. "The national media doesn't really care about the border," del Bosque said. "They hit it like a piñata and take off."

#### No spillover

Hing and Lee, 10 (Julianne Ong, RaceWire co-editor and the editorial assistant at ColorLines, and Hatty, Production manager for ARC and ColorLines Magazine, “The border violence lie,” June 15, http://www.racialicious.com/2010/06/15/the-border-violence-lie/)

Immigration may be a deeply divisive political discussion, but there’s one point upon which everybody from Barack Obama to Jan Brewer seem to agree: America’s southern border is a lawless, violent land. The guns have followed the premise. Obama has beefed up border cops, sent in National Guard troops and launched unmanned drones—all that’s missing are the Marines, for now. Increased violence has predictably followed the increased militarization. Two border patrol encounters in the past two weeks have ended in the deaths of unarmed civilians, sparking outrage from Mexican authorities and immigrant rights groups who say that Border Patrol officers routinely use excessive force. On June 7, a 15-year-old boy named [Sergio Adrian Hernandez Huereca](http://www.racewire.org/archives/2010/06/fbi_opens_civil_rights_probe_into_border_patrols_shooting.html) from Juarez, Mexico, was shot and killed by a Border Patrol agent at Puente Negro, an international bridge that joins El Paso, Texas, and Juarez. On May 26, a Border Patrol officer at the San Ysidro, California-Tijuana border shot a 32-year-old man named Anastacio Hernandez with a stun gun. The San Diego County coroner has ruled his death a homicide. Attorney General Eric Holder called the deaths “extremely regrettable,” and the FBI formally initiated a civil rights investigation on Friday into the teen’s death in Jaurez. Texas [Rep. Henry Cuellar told The Hill newspaper](http://thehill.com/homenews/house/102899-dem-border-lawmakers-violent-incidents-will-come-with-more-enforcement) that his subcommittee may investigate as well, but also conceded, “As you have more presence of Border Patrol and other federal officials on the border, you’re going to probably run into more types of incidents like that.” Largely quiet on the “incidents like that,” however, are the elected officials who have spent the year drumming up reports of border violence to create political space for anti-immigrant policy. When Arizona Gov. Jan Brewer signed SB1070 into state law in April, she described the border as a lawless, violent war zone. “Our international border creeps its way north,” she warned. “We cannot sacrifice our safety to the murderous greed of drug cartels.” Last week, a Louisiana sheriff—St. Bernard Parish’s Jack Stephens—justified [harassing immigrant oil spill workers](http://www.colorlines.com/article.php?ID=732) by asserting that “illegal aliens” were posing as workers to set up gangs in the area. National Democrats and Republicans alike have echoed the local officials. President Obama implicitly acknowledged the supposed dangers of life at the border when he announced in May plans to send 1,200 National Guard troops and an extra $500 million to the border. That’s not nearly enough for [electioneering Sen. John McCain](http://www.racewire.org/archives/2010/05/mccain_promotes_danged_fence_appeals_to_danged_ignorance.html), who has wedged funding for 6,000 more border troops into the Senate’s pending defense authorization bill. The same week Obama announced his troop increase, Texas Sen. John Cornyn—who wants to redirect $2.2 billion from the stimulus for border security—wrote in an op-ed: “Our porous border endangers every American, yet Washington refuses to make border security a priority.” When reporters pressed Cornyn in a phone conference about the violence he so feared, the senator got stuck. “As far as the Texas border is concerned, to my knowledge, we have not had spillover violence, per se,” he told reporters. It was actually “the threat of potential spill over violence,” he later clarified. More accurately, it’s the perception of that violence. Because the realities simply do not support the rhetoric about public safety in border states. As ColorLines’ graphic illustrates, crime in key cities near the U.S.-Mexico border is on the decline—just like it is all over the country. The murder rate in San Diego, Calif., dropped by 25 percent last year. Phoenix’s decreased by 27 percent. El Paso saw a 29 percent drop in murders, bested by Tucson, Ariz., which saw a 46 percent decline in murders. The national murder rate went down just 10 percent from 2008 to 2009. When it comes to violent crime more generally, all four of these border cities hover around four to six violent crimes per capita, just under the national average of 6.6. “[Politicians] are creating the artificial reality that the border is out of control, that it spills over. None of that is true,” says Fernando Garcia, the executive director of the El Paso-based Border Network for Human Rights. “We have a very sustainable sense of security in the community, good relations with local law enforcement.” “There is a perception of the border that whatever ails the U.S. as a country has to come from the outside rather from looking internally,” adds Maria Jimenez, an immigrant rights organizer who works with America Para Todos in Houston. The expectation that more militarization will make the border safer is “unfair to Border Patrol and Customs people, too,” Jimenez says.

#### No protectionism and no impact on trade -- multiple international checks.

Dadush et al., ‘11

[Uri, senior associate and director in Carnegie’s new International Economics Program, currently focuses on trends in the global economy and the global financial crisis, previously served as the World Bank’s director of international trade and before that as director of economic policy. He also served as the director of the Bank’s world economy group, leading the preparation of the Bank’s flagship reports on the international economy, Shimelse Ali, economist, Carnegie’s International Economics Program, Rachel Esplin Odell, junior fellow in Carnegie’s Asia Program, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, “Is Protectionism Dying?”, May, <http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/is_protectionism_dying.pdf>]

Despite a limited increase in the incidence of protectionist measures during the recent financial and economic crisis, the effects on global trade appear small—the world, remarkably, did not resort to protectionism. In addition to the concerted stimulus measures, financial rescues, and the strengthening of lender-of-last-resort facilities that restricted the duration and depth of the economic downturn, the World Trade Organization’s disciplines, enforceable through its dispute settlement mechanism, no doubt played an important role in staving off trade protection. But this is only one part of the story. The increased resistance to protectionism is the result of a complex, mutually reinforcing set of legal and structural changes in the world economy that have made a return to protection more costly and disruptive and have established new vested interests in open markets. These changes include: • National disciplines: Along with autonomous liberalization and a generally robust rule of law in the largest trading countries—which improve the confidence of importers and exporters—national trade tribunals help prevent protectionism by providing a mechanism whereby individual firms can contest protectionist measures that impact their company. Many national governments have also developed explicit or implicit mechanisms for countering protectionism and ensuring that trade policy reflects the general interest. • Regional and bilateral agreements: In addition to codifying further tariff reductions, regional trade agreements—now covering over half of world trade—contain provisions establishing dispute settlement mechanisms that parties can use to contest violations of the agreement and thereby defend against protectionism. Furthermore, such agreements have often established regular high-level dialogues on trade disputes, treaty implementation, and further liberalization, providing a mechanism for resolving serious violations of the agreement even if its formal juridical mechanisms are not utilized. • “Facts on the ground”: The political resistance to backsliding on liberalization is stronger because trade has become more prevalent and inextricably woven into production and consumption patterns. The change in the political economy of protectionism is manifested in the increased interest of retailers and consumers in imports, the internationalization of production, and the rise of intrafirm trade. Limiting trade in any one sector not only hurts those consumers, retailers, and firms that depend on imports for inputs, but also has repercussions for firms that operate both vertically (within a sector) and horizontally (across sectors) that depend on complex global production chains.

## 1nr

### 1nr – politics

#### LA Times also says we solve the Chinese economy – solves nuclear war

**Kaminski 07** (Antoni Z., Professor – Institute of Political Studies, “World Order: The Mechanics of Threats (Central European Perspective)”, Polish Quarterly of International Affairs, 1, p. 58)

As already argued, the economic advance of China has taken place with relatively few corresponding changes in the political system, although the operation of political and economic institutions has seen some major changes. Still, tools are missing that would allow the establishment of political and legal foundations for the modem economy, or they are too weak. The tools are efficient public administration, the rule of law, clearly defined ownership rights, efficient banking system, etc. For these reasons, many experts fear an economic crisis in China. Considering the importance of the state for the development of the global economy, the crisis would have serious global repercussions. Its political ramifications could be no less dramatic owing to the special position the military occupies in the Chinese political system, and the existence of many potential vexed issues in East Asia (disputes over islands in the China Sea and the Pacific). A potential hotbed of conflict is also Taiwan's status. Economic recession and the related destabilization of internal policies could lead to a political, or even military crisis. The likelihood of the global escalation of the conflict is high, as the interests of Russia, China, Japan, Australia and, first and foremost, the US clash in the region.

#### Relations key to global democracy

Ayoob 2k – distinguished professor of international relations at Michigan State University (Mohammed, Winter 2000, The Washington Quarterly, accessed via Project Muse)

Furthermore, the recent emphasis in U.S. rhetoric on creation of a "democratic community of states," itself based on a popularized version of the "democratic peace" thesis, can be expected to aid in improving Indian-U.S. relations. The two states crucial to legitimizing the idea of a global democratic community are obviously the world's largest democracy (India) and the world's most powerful democracy (the United States), and their partnership is essential for the idea to be taken seriously. 3 If democracy and human rights are to inform U.S. foreign policy making in any substantial fashion in the coming decade, Washington's relations with New Delhi must inevitably move to a higher plane of understanding and cooperation.

#### CIR is THE issue

Shifter 12

[Michael, President of the Inter-American Dialogue, Adjunct Professor of Latin American Studies at Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service, “Remaking the Relationship,” Inter-American Dialogue Policy Report, April, <http://www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/IAD2012PolicyReportFINAL.pdf>]

Still another advance could come through US immigration reform. By better ¶ aligning the supply and demand for workers in critical industries and opening new opportunities for millions of currently unauthorized residents, a ¶ more pragmatic migration policy would significantly bolster the US economy .¶ No other single policy measure would more clearly demonstrate US commitment to cooperation with Latin America . The comprehensive reform advocated by both the George W. Bush and the Obama administrations represents the best approach. More modest changes, however, could still be helpful

#### CIR is the vital internal link to resiliency- collapse possible without deeper ties

Davis ’10 (Ted, School of Public Policy @ George Mason University, Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management, 2/18-20, “The Global Dynamic: of High-Skill Migration: The Case of U.S./India Relations”, <https://www.appam.org/conferences/international/maastricht2010/sessions/downloads/389.1.pdf>)

There is no reason to think that the present system of governing migration is optimal. Migration is a dynamic process, while the migration policy-making machinery is slow and cumbersome. The possibility that policy-makers will fail to capitalize on opportunities for mutual gain among sending and receiving countries is especially large for high-skill migration. At first glance, the case of India — U.S. relations would appear to contradict this point. As noted, both India and the U.S. have experienced significant benefits from migration and circulation. Yet many Indians still live in poverty and many Americans see India, its immigrants and offshore services, as a threat to their jobs and wages. Thus there is a growing tension between these countries that could impede, if not derail, further progress. Absent a program of cooperation, and perhaps exacerbated by the economic downturn, there is a risk that each country would be inclined to act unilaterally in pursuit of its own interests. However, these typically protectionist or nationalistic actions may impede the flow of immigrants, but it could impede the flow of ideas, reduce knowledge spillovers, and ultimately inhibit innovation and growth.¶ Cooperation on migration offers an opportunity for countries to address the tensions that arise from immigration while opening avenues for pursuing common objectives and mutual prosperity. Though it may be desirable to consider a common system of migration across countries that transcend bilateral arrangements, such a system may not be able to address the unique dynamics that exist between countries. Nor should these relationships be viewed uniformly. Differences exist between sectors, such as technology services and medical services that call for their own strategies. This paper represents only a beginning point for understanding

#### Spillover highly possible- deep relations are a new development- CIR needed to cement ties

Lal & Rajagopalan ’05 (Rollie, Assistant Professor at Vlerick Management School in Leuven, Belgium and political scientist for RAND, Rajesh, Associate Professor in International Politics, Center for International Politics, “US-India Strategic Dialogue”, <http://www.rand.org/pubs/conf_proceedings/2005/RAND_CF201.pdf>)

Relations between the world's two largest democracies, India and the United States, have encountered many obstacles over the years. Until recently, the two countries had limited interactions and few cooperative endeavours. However, the relationship has improved dramatically over the past several years, and today is better than at any previous point in history'. Through dialogue on a number of issues, at various levels of government, academia, and the press, the current relationship has achieved great depth and maturity.¶ This is the kind of interaction that both India and the United States will need to keep working at rather than take for granted. Candid exchange of ideas is the key to ensuring that natural differences of interests and perspectives do not lead back to the estrangement that characterized die relationship between the two countries for the last half a century.

#### EU models US CIR liberalization

JEROEN DOOMERNIK TRANSATLANTIC ACADEMY REY KOSLOWSKI TRANSATLANTIC ACADEMY AND DIETRICH THRÄNHARDT TRANSATLANTIC ACADEMY 2009 The German Marshall Fund of the United States http://www.gmfus.org/brusselsforum/2009/docs/BF\_Battle4Brain\_Final.pdf

Selective migration policies are proliferating among migrant destination countries of the developed world. Canada, Australia, the United States, New Zealand, Germany, Great Britain, France, the Netherlands, Ireland, and the Czech Republic have devised special visas and programs to attract scientists, highly-skilled engineers, medical professionals, computer programmers, and information technology professionals from developing countries such as India and China. The proliferation of these immigration policies has set up a competitive dynamic. Germany’s Independent Commission on Migration to Germany, led by Rita Süssmuth, described it in terms of a “battle for the brains.”1 This competition has taken on a transatlantic dimension as European policymakers call for policy changes with explicit reference to their competitors across the Atlantic. For example, French President Nicolas Sarkozy has argued that “the most qualified migrants, the most dynamic and competent ones head to the American continent, while immigrants with little or no skills come to Europe” (Bennhold 2006). Not only do EU member states wish to compete with the United States and Canada for the highly skilled, they have initiated new selective immigration policies that copy elements of the Canadian-style point system as well as the U.S. temporary H1-B visa for high-skilled workers.

#### Vital internal link to stop inevitable EU econ collapse and soft power

Stefan Theil, Newsweek's European economics editor, 2-19-2010 http://www.newsweek.com/2010/02/18/europe-s-big-choice.html

As these trends intensify, Europe will face a stark choice. It can appease the angry masses and slam the doors. Or it can defy public opinion and open the gates to more and better-skilled immigrants. Doing so will be difficult politically. But it is also a necessary part of ensuring the continent's economic recovery and long-term vitality. While inviting more foreigners in might seem an odd choice today, Europe simply can't afford not to. Should it force itself to become a more open, mobile society—modeled on traditional immigrant countries such as Canada, Australia, and the U.S.—it will thrive. If it locks its doors and halts integration, on the other hand, it will wind up like Japan: shriveling, xenophobic, and resigned to decline. Europe's need for immigrants owes in part to demographics. The continent's population is aging so fast, it needs young newcomers to fill the gaps. This year deaths will outnumber births in 10 of the EU's 27 member states, including two of its biggest, Germany and Italy. By 2015 this phenomenon will have spread to the EU as a whole, and by 2035 the death gap will have grown to 1 million a year. According to the European Commission, the Union will have 52 million fewer people of working age by 2050, making it harder to compete with younger, more vibrant countries like China or the United States, or to support Europe's own senior citizens. Even now, businesses across the continent face chronic shortages of skilled workers such as engineers, technicians, craftspeople, and medical staff. Despite the downturn, there are now some 4 million unfilled jobs in Europe. "Every one of our clients has positions they can't fill because of [labor] shortages," says Barbara Beck, European head of Manpower. With time, these problems will only grow. Economists predict that global GDP will double in the next 20 years, and as many as 1 billion new skilled jobs will be created. But to capture its share of this growth and support its aging population, Europe will need far more skilled workers than it currently produces. Getting them will mean attracting more of the global talent pool. According to the European Commission, Europe will need 20 million skilled immigrants over the next 20 years just to maintain its position. Should it fail to get them, Europe will not only become smaller and poorer; it will also see its own best and brightest decamp for better opportunities in the growing economies of China, India, and Brazil.

#### **It’s at the top of the docket**

Neuman, 10/17/13 writer @ NPR(Scott Neuman, “Obama Calls For Budget, Immigration Reform By Year's End”, http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-way/2013/10/17/236223833/obama-calls-for-budget-immigration-reform-by-years-end)//Holmes

President Obama slammed the partisan standoff "spectacle" that he said had damaged the economy and America's international credibility and called on Congress to pass a comprehensive budget, immigration reform and a farm bill by year's end. He praised "Democrats and responsible Republicans who came together" to pass a last-minute deal to reverse a partial government shutdown and narrowly avert the expiration of the federal borrowing authority. "Let's be clear, there are no winners here," he said. "These last few weeks have inflicted completely unnecessary damage to our economy," he said. "The American people are completely fed up with Washington," he added. The president's remarks follow a 16-day hiatus in many government operations that he said had cost billions of dollars. "There was no economic rationale for this," the president said of the shutdown. "Today I want our people, our businesses and the rest of the world to know that our faith and credit remains unquestioned," the president said. He called for a renewed, bipartisan effort to pass a comprehensive budget, fix the "broken" immigration system and get a farm bill passed. "This can and should get done by the end of this year," he said. Finally, he said he had a message for federal workers, who were either furloughed or kept working without pay: "Thank you. Thanks for your service. Welcome back. What you do is important. It matters."

#### No Other Priorities – Obama Has Trimmed His Agenda

Nedra Pickler 10/17 2013 Obama: Focus on budget, immigration, farm bill http://www.myrtlebeachonline.com/2013/10/17/3778131/obama-focus-on-budget-immigration.html#storylink=cpy

Obama has slashed his wish list from earlier this year, when he called for legislation to address climate change, an increase in the minimum wage, gun control and the closure of the Guantanamo Bay prison. The reduced priorities underscore how difficult it has been to get legislation through Congress, the short legislative calendar left this year and Obama's limited political capital.

#### Fractured GOP Means Obama PC is Sufficient Even If Its Low

Felsenthal, 10/16/13, writer @ Reuters(Mark Felsenthal, “Obama plans immigration push after fiscal crisis ends”, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/10/16/us-usa-obama-immigration-idUSBRE99F01Q20131016)//Holmes

"Once that's done, you know, the day after, I'm going to be pushing to say, call a vote on immigration reform," he told the Los Angeles affiliate of Spanish-language television network Univision. The president's domestic agenda has been sidetracked in his second term by one problem after another. As he coped with the revelation of domestic surveillance programs, chemical weapons in Syria, and a fiscal battle that has shut down the U.S. government and threatens a debt default, immigration has been relegated to the back burner. But Obama, who won re-election with overwhelming Hispanic backing, had hoped to make reforms easing the plight of the 11 million immigrants who are in the United States illegally. In June, the Senate passed an immigration overhaul, but House of Representatives Republicans are divided over the granting of legal status to those in the country illegally, a step many see as rewarding lawbreakers. Although the president had sought comprehensive reform, he said last month he would be open to the House taking a piece-by-piece approach if that would get the job done. Obama on Tuesday blamed House Speaker John Boehner for preventing immigration from coming up for a vote. "We had a very strong Democratic and Republican vote in the Senate," he said. "The only thing right now that's holding it back is, again, Speaker Boehner not willing to call the bill on the floor of the House of Representatives." Boehner said the sweeping Senate bill would not pass the House and has said the lower chamber would tackle the issue in smaller sections that would include stricter provisions on border protection.

#### Victory From the Shutdown Means Obama Has the Momentum to Pass CIR

McMorris, 10/15/13(Evan McMorris, “Obama Has Already Won The Shutdown Fight And He’s Coming For Immigration Next”, http://www.buzzfeed.com/evanmcsan/obama-has-already-won-the-shutdown-fight-and-hes-coming-for)//Holmes

WASHINGTON — As the fiscal fight roiling Washington nears its end, the White House is already signaling that it plans to use the political momentum it has gained during the shutdown fight to charge back into the immigration debate. And this time, Democratic pollsters and advocates say, they could actually win. The final chapter of the current crisis hasn’t been written yet, but Democrats in Washington are privately confident that they’ll emerge with the upper hand over the conservatives in Congress who forced a government shutdown. And sources say the administration plans to use its victory to resurrect an issue that was always intended to be a top priority of Obama’s second-term agenda. Advocates argue the post-fiscal crisis political reality could thaw debate on the issue in the House, which froze in earlier this year after the Senate passed a bipartisan immigration bill that was led by Republican Sen. Marco Rubio and Democratic Sen. Chuck Schumer. “It’s at least possible with sinking poll numbers for the Republicans, with a [GOP] brand that is badly damaged as the party that can’t govern responsibly and is reckless that they’re going to say, ‘All right, what can we do that will be in our political interest and also do tough things?’” said Frank Sharry, executive director of the immigration reform group America’s Voice. “That’s where immigration could fill the bill.” The White House and Democrats are “ready” to jump back into the immigration fray when the fiscal crises ends, Sharry said. And advocates are already drawing up their plans to put immigration back on the agenda — plans they’ll likely initiate the morning after a fiscal deal is struck. “We’re talking about it. We want to be next up and we’re going to position ourselves that way,” Sharry said. “There are different people doing different things, and our movement will be increasingly confrontational with Republicans, including civil disobedience. A lot of people are going to say, ‘We’re not going to wait.’” The White House isn’t ready to talk about the world after the debt limit fight yet, but officials have signaled strongly they want to put immigration back on the agenda.

#### Obama using PC on CIR now and fiscal fights provide impetus for the GOP to compromise

Hartmann, 10/16/13, writer @ New Yorker(Margaret Hartmann, “Obama Is Over the Shutdown, Wants to Tackle Immigration Reform”, http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2013/10/obama-plans-for-immigration-reform-post-shutdown.html)//Holmes

Shortly after John Boehner's last-ditch effort to end the shutdown and raise the debt ceiling ended in a humiliating defeat on Tuesday, reports emerged that President Obama was already plotting out his next move, saying of the fiscal crisis, "Once that’s done, you know, the day after – I’m going to be pushing to say, call a vote on immigration reform." While Democrats appear to have the upper hand, that still seemed a bit presumptuous. Things ended on Tuesday night with sources reporting that Harry Reid and Mitch McConnell are finalizing a deal, but the nation is still careening toward default. The full transcript of Obama's interview reveals that he actually made the comments earlier in the day, and was bashing House Republicans for starting a "crisis that was unnecessary," then throwing a "little bit of a wrench" in the Senate's effort to get us out of it. But yes, Obama does sound anxious to start talking about immigration again. Obama brought up immigration in an interview with KMEX, L.A.'s Univision affiliate, while rattling off a list of things Congress should be focusing on instead of engaging in childish brinksmanship, such as infrastructure, jobs, and raising the minimum wage. "We shouldn't be inflicting damage on the economy simply because one side doesn't get its way," he said. When asked about immigration reform specifically, Obama said it's not "just a Latino issue," but "an American issue." He explained: We know our economy will grow faster if immigration reform passes. We know businesses will do better if immigration reform passes. We know that deficits will be reduced if immigration reform passes; because people coming out of the shadows, paying more taxes growing, the growth accelerating, all that brings down the deficit, so it's important for everybody. Some advocates say passing immigration reform may actually be easier in the wake of the shutdown. "It’s at least possible with sinking poll numbers for the Republicans, with a [GOP] brand that is badly damaged as the party that can’t govern responsibly and is reckless that they’re going to say, 'Alright, what can we do that will be in our political interest and also do tough things?'" Frank Sharry, executive director of the immigration reform group America’s Voice, told BuzzFeed.

#### Plan’s massively controversial --- GOP hates it

Hanson 10 (Stephanie, Associate Editor and Coordinating Editor – CFR, “U.S.-Cuba Relations”, Council on Foreign Relations Report, 1-11, http://www.cfr.org/publication/11113/uscuba\_relations.html)

Ending the economic embargo against Cuba would require congressional approval. Opinions in Congress are mixed: A group of influential Republican lawmakers from Florida--Lincoln Diaz-Balart, his brother Mario Diaz-Balart, and Ileana Ros-Lehtinen--is strongly anti-Castro. Still, many favor improving relations with Cuba. In 2002, a bipartisan group of senators, the Congressional Cuban Working Group, proposed a set of measures that included lifting the travel ban and allowing private financing of food and agriculture sales. In 2003, both the House and Senate voted to lift the travel ban, but the measure was removed after President Bush threatened a veto. In 2009, Sen. Richard Lugar (R-IN), the top-ranking Republican on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, released a report calling for U.S. policy changes. He said: "We must recognize the ineffectiveness of our current policy and deal with the Cuban regime in a way that [enhances U.S. interests" (PDF)](http://lugar.senate.gov/sfrc/pdf/Cuba.pdf) What is the likelihood that the United States and Cuba will resume diplomatic relations? Given the range of issues dividing the two countries, experts say a long process would precede resumption of diplomatic relations. Daniel P. Erikson of the Inter-American Dialogue says that though "you could have the resumption of bilateral talks on issues related to counternarcotics or immigration, or a period of détente, you are probably not going to see the full restoration of diplomatic relations" in the near term. Many recent policy reports have recommended that the United States take some unilateral steps to roll back sanctions on Cuba. The removal of sanctions, however, would be just one step in the process of normalizing relations. Such a process is sure to be controversial, as indicated by the heated congressional debate spurred in March 2009 by attempts to include provisions easing travel and trade restrictions in a large appropriations bill. These provisions passed in a March 10 vote. "Whatever we call it--normalization, detente, rapproachement--it is clear that the policy process risks falling victim to the politics of the issue," says Sweig. At the start of 2010, there were several bills before Congress that aimed to lift travel restrictions, but experts think it's unlikely that these measures will pass (MiamiHerald).

#### Backlash to the jailing of Gross makes the plan a fight

Cave ‘12(Easing Restraints in Cuba Renews Debate On U.S. Embargo November 20, 2012 Damien CaveDamien Cave is a foreign correspondent for The New York Times, based in Mexico City. Along with two other reporters, he covers Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean. <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/20/world/americas/changes-in-cuba-create-support-for-easing-embargo.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0> Pennington

And Cuba has a long history of tossing ice on warming relations. The latest example is the jailing of Alan Gross, a State Department contractor who has spent nearly three years behind bars for distributing satellite telephone equipment to Jewish groups in Havana. In Washington, Mr. Gross is seen as the main impediment to an easing of the embargo, but there are also limits to what the president could do without Congressional action. The 1992 Cuban Democracy Act conditioned the waiving of sanctions on the introduction of democratic changes inside Cuba. The 1996 Helms-Burton Act also requires that the embargo remain until Cuba has a transitional or democratically elected government. Obama administration officials say they have not given up, and could move if the president decides to act on his own. Officials say that under the Treasury Department’s licensing and regulation-writing authority, there is room for significant modification. Following the legal logic of Mr. Obama’s changes in 2009, further expansions in travel are possible along with new allowances for investment or imports and exports, especially if narrowly applied to Cuban businesses. Even these adjustments — which could also include travel for all Americans and looser rules for ships engaged in trade with Cuba, according to a legal analysis commissioned by the Cuba Study Group — would probably mean a fierce political fight. The handful of Cuban-Americans in Congress for whom the embargo is sacred oppose looser rules.

#### Recent embargo repeal bill proves backlash to opening trade with Cuba

House 5-12 [Billy House - National Journal Daily Extra PM “Cuba Bill Ties Embargo to Prisoner's Release”, May 12th, 2013, lexis]

A veteran House Democrat introduced a bill last week to lift the 50-year-old U.S. embargo against Cuba. But in a new twist, the bill would tie such a move to the "immediate" and "unconditional" release of an American from a Cuban prison and the removal of Cuba from the State Department's list of states that sponsor terrorism. "Cuba is no longer a threat to the United States, and the continuation of the embargo on trade between the two countries declared in 1962 is not fulfilling the purpose for which it was established," Rep. Bobby Rush, D-Ill., said in announcing his legislation. While Rush's bill generally follows in the footsteps of the United States-Cuba Trade Normalization Act that he initially introduced in 2009, Rush certainly is not the only lawmaker to craft legislation to ease relations with the island nation off Florida. But by linking any lifting of the embargo to the release of American prisoner Alan Gross, a Maryland man arrested in Cuba in 2009, Rush will surely draw the ire of Cuba-policy hard-liners inside and out of Congress. While such opposition is almost certain to block the bill from becoming law, it may also draw attention to issues that have all but frozen any efforts to improve relations between the two countries. Gross had been working as a government subcontractor for the U.S. Agency for International Development as part of a democracy-building program, only to be arrested and prosecuted for alleged crimes against Cuba in providing satellite phones and computer equipment without a permit. The Cubans claim his activities were aimed at destabilizing their government, and he is currently serving a 15-year prison sentence. Meanwhile, the State Department continues to list Cuba as a sponsor of terrorist groups, as it has since 1982. State Department spokesman Patrick Ventrell told reporters recently that the administration "has no current plans to remove Cuba from the list," despite calls for that. The list also includes Iran, Sudan, and Syria. U.S. lawmakers who were part of a bipartisan congressional delegation that traveled to Cuba in February say their discussions with President Raul Castro revealed there is interest in improving relations, but they acknowledge that the imprisonment of Gross and the State Department designation loom as major impediments. Rep. Chris Van Hollen, D-Md., was on that trip, and he is one of two lawmakers to directly meet with Gross, who is from Van Hollen's district. In an interview with National Journal, Van Hollen said, "The continued detention of Alan Gross has been a significant obstacle to improved relations between the U.S. and Cuba." But the congressman said the inability to resolve the matter serves the interests of hard-liners in both countries, who would prefer not to see improved relations.

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**They create a perception that the U.S. is weak**

**Bolton 02, Senior Vice President of the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, (John R., Chicago Journal of International Law, Fall, 1 Chi. J. Int'l L. 205)**

The Globalists' second approach is specifically targeted against the United States, in an effort to bend our system into something more compatible with human rights and other standards more generally accepted elsewhere. This conscious effort at limiting "American exceptionalism" is consistent with the larger effort to constrain national autonomy because the United States as a whole is the most important skeptic of these efforts. Every time America is forced to bend its knee to international pressure, it sets a significant, and detrimental, precedent for all of the others.